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Abstract 
 
Ethiopia is exercising decentralisation of the health system and thus this study assesses 
lessons learned about the experiences of the decentralization of institutions in theoretical 
terms. The problem investigated in this study concerns the lack of institutional capacity to 
effectively provide services, lack of transparency, responsibility and accountability. 
Decision making is also very remote from the people with regard to resource allocation 
and public health service delivery. The scope of this study covers the Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and People’s Regional State of Ethiopia and its relationship with the Cheha 
District in the area of health service decentralization. 
 
The objective of this study was to identify fundamental elements of decentralization of 
health institutions and the impact on the performance of the health system at local 
government level in the Cheha District in Ethiopia. The specific objective of this study 
was to find out how the provision and delivery of health services are related to 
decentralization policies, analyze and discuss the federal, national and local policies for 
health service decentralization and their significance for health service delivery. An 
additional aspect of this study is to provide some insights into intergovernmental relations 
as far as health service decentralization is concerned and, to this effect, this study applied 
the principal agent approach. 
 
In this study health service decentralization policies in Ethiopia at national and local 
levels were analyzed to gather information relating to the service delivery process. Most 
of the data for the study was collected during field research conducted between August 
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and November 2005. During the field research, interviews were conducted with experts, 
community members and government officials both at the local and national level. The 
field research also focused on collecting data which is relevant to explain the relationship 
of the principal, in this case the Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH) and the SNNPRS 
Health Bureau at the regional government level and its agent, the Cheha District Health 
Office. 
The field research also identified the different mechanisms, tools, and institutional 
arrangements (annual reports, meetings, and supervision) that exist in SNNPRS and the 
Cheha District to achieve the broader objective of the health system. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background  
 
The Mini-thesis focuses on the experience of the institution of decentralization by the 
Federal Government of Ethiopia particularly with regard to the health system, taking the 
Cheha 1 District, which is located in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ 
Regional State (SNNPRS)2 as a case study.  
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia has practiced the decentralization policy 
since 1991. It must be remembered that Ethiopia is a country with a very centralized state 
history. During the Imperial regime, the feudal monarchy controlled all political and 
administrative institutions and during the military regime (the “Derg”3 regime), all power 
belonged to the central government. The institutions of that time also centralized and 
controlled provision of services under the name of socialism4.  
 
However, since 1991, the order of centralized government began to be challenged by the 
new regime that is the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).The 
centralized government failed and hence the country started new practices and ideas. As a 
result, political, fiscal and administrative decentralization were introduced and the unitary 
state of Ethiopia became federal. New boundaries were drawn and decentralization 
through devolution was the strategy adopted. The existing constitution is the legal basis 
for practicing decentralization in Ethiopia. 
  
                                                 
1 Cheha is a District with a population of around 200,000 people, located in the southern part of Ethiopia. The District 
is where the author of the thesis was born and grew up, thus being able to experience and observes the environment. 
2 Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS) is one of the 9 regional states of Ethiopia 
with more than 100 districts, 45 ethnic groups and a population of 11 million. 
3“Derg” is the name of the military government of Ethiopia in the local language. 
4 Levies, 2002.pp.10-35. 
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Accordingly, nine regional states, entrusted with broad powers including a right to 
secession5 if some conditions are fulfilled, were established. The Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS) is one of these regional states with 
a population of 11.3 million and, administratively, it is divided into 12 zones (Sub-
Regions) and 104 Districts. Cheha is one of the Districts located at the southern part of 
the SNNPRS with a total of 175,000 inhabitants. 
 
Following the political decentralization, the government of Ethiopia also decentralized 
sector offices and hence the health system is also decentralized in Ethiopia. The Ministry 
of Health (MOH), at least in principle, transferred power and responsibilities to Regional 
Governments, and Regional Governments claim that they devolved the responsibility and 
resources to the District Administrations. 
1.1 Research problem and key research question 
The main goal of decentralization is to strengthen existing local government units to 
achieve effective functioning of the fiscal, political and administrative assignments 
allotted to them. Decentralization has been considered as being a way of enhancing the 
economic development of a country, along with good governance, democratization and 
increasing citizen participation. The failure of a centralized system to meet national goals 
is the main reason for many countries looking seriously beyond top-down developmental 
and fiscal management strategies than they have in the past6.  
 
                                                 
5 Article 39 of the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution. 
6 Paul Smoke 2004.p.1. 
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Decentralization is discussed as the transfer of authority and responsibility for public 
function from the central government to subordinate or quasi-independent government 
organizations or the private sector7. Therefore, decentralization is also considered a key 
means of improving health sector performance as it involves different mechanisms to 
transfer fiscal and administrative ownership and/or political authority from the central 
Ministry of Health (MOH) to alternate institutions8. 
It must be noted that, during the last two decades, health sector decentralization policies 
have been implemented on a broad scale in many developing countries mainly as part of 
a broader process of political, economic and technical reforms9. 
 
Though the health system in Ethiopia is said to be decentralized, there are many problems 
related to the process of exercising the principles of decentralization. The government 
claims that they have exercised a devolution type of decentralization and hence, in 
principle, District Governments are endowed with all powers for decision-making.  
 
However, one can easily discover that there are many problems at the District level 
concerning health service delivery by the Cheha District Health Office.  As it is 
impossible to deal with all the problems facing the Cheha District Health service delivery 
system, the Mini-Thesis analyzes the following specific problems. The intergovernmental 
relationship, that is to say, the relation of the FMOH, SNNPRS Health Bureau and the 
Cheha District Health Office is not as strong as it should be. The intergovernmental 
transfer used by the SNNPRS to assign the District grant is also vague. The other major 
                                                 
7 Litvack and Seddon, June 20 http://www.gtz.de/en/index.htm internet-team@gtz.de. 
8 World Bank, 1993.p.26. 
9 Thomas J Bossert and Joel C Beauvais, 2002.p.16 
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problem of the Cheha District Health Office is the lack of appropriate resources (budget, 
health professionals and equipment) in place to provide efficient health service delivery. 
Most of the people in Cheha District do not have access to primary health services and 
this is mainly because of a limited number of health facilities and professionals in the 
District. The majority of the people of Cheha District also do not have the ability to pay 
for the health services. There is very limited or no access to free medical services which 
negatively affects vulnerable groups. 
 1.2 Purpose and Objectives 
The main purpose and research objective of this Mini-Thesis is therefore to identify 
fundamental elements/ institutions in health system decentralization and the implication 
on the performance of the health system at local government level. The Mini-Thesis 
assesses how the provision and delivery of health services are related to the 
decentralization policies in the health system taking the Cheha District as a case study. 
1.3 Significance of the study 
There has been limited research done concerning the decentralization policy in Ethiopia, 
particularly in relation to service delivery, which has not been discussed in detail in the 
past. This Mini-Thesis will therefore provide some insight for different policy makers in 
Ethiopia and it can also be used as a source for the Cheha District Health Office, which 
doesn’t have any well-documented resources as far as health service delivery is 
concerned.  
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1.4 Scope of the study 
The Mini-Thesis assesses health service decentralization in Ethiopia by taking into 
account only one regional government, the SNNPRS, and its relationship with the Cheha 
District in terms of health service decentralization. 
1.5 Setting of the Methodology 
Most of the data for the study has been collected during field research conducted between 
August and November 2005. The relation of the Ethiopian Ministry of Health (MOH) 
with the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS) Health 
Bureau is a suitable case to study as concerns the decentralization of the health system in 
Ethiopia as the SNNPRS is among the biggest regional state of the country compromising 
more than 45 nationalities. There are more than 120 Districts in the SNNPRS. However, 
taking into account the limitation both in terms of time and other resources, it is 
impossible to study more than one District in detail during the field research and, hence, 
the research concentrated on one District, that is, the Cheha District and this will enable a 
relatively good analysis10. 
 
The justification in choosing the Cheha District as the case study is based on my 
knowledge of Ethiopia in general and that of the SNNPRS and the Cheha District in 
particular. I have chosen the Cheha District as my case study to assess the 
decentralization of health services in Ethiopia and its implication in health service 
delivery as this District is considered to be relatively effective with regard to health 
service provision. The researcher of this Mini- Thesis was born and raised in this District 
and therefore has a linguistic advantage in conducting the study there. The other 
                                                 
10 Cheha is considered as a relatively better district with regard to the health sector. 
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justification in choosing this area is that the District is considered to be a relatively  
successful District in the SNNPRS not only with regard to health service delivery but also 
in having better local government administration11and hence assessing the situation is 
more pertinent and interesting. 
  
As with any Mini-Thesis there are limitations in this research too and such limitations 
include the fact that choosing a single District might not be as representative as one 
would wish since the researcher was not be able to conduct comparative checks whether 
the decentralization of health services has the same or comparable relationship and 
implications for service delivery in other districts too. This is because all the Districts in 
the SNNPRS have different backgrounds and realities and hence the findings of the 
Cheha District will not necessarily reflect the realities of other Districts although there 
are a lot of common findings. The other limitation of this research is that the researcher 
could not analyze the impact of health system Decentralization on the beneficiaries as 
this was not manageable given the limited time and resources allocated for the research. 
 
When we come to the data needed for the analysis of health service decentralization in 
Ethiopia, we should bear in mind that the overall aim of health sector reform in the 
country was to improve health service delivery and distribute it equitably. The research 
therefore concentrates on collecting data which is relevant to explain the relationship of 
the principal, in this case the Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH?) and the SNNPRS 
                                                 
11 The SNNPRS health office report on annual activities for the year 2005 indicates that the Cheha district is among the 
more relatively effective districts in the region with regard to health and governance issues. 
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Health Bureaus at the Regional Government level and the agent, that is, the Cheha 
District Health Office. 
 
In assessing the principal-agent relationship, the way decisions are taking place with 
regard to health systems  at the federal, regional and district level have been studied and 
hence data has been collected to identify who decides on what. The research has also 
identified how health financing is collected and distributed, and to what extent the 
District exercises independent decisions with regard to health spending and planning.  
The formal laws and regulations which guide and bind the principal-agent relationship, 
including enforcing mechanisms, have been also studied during the field research. The 
research also identified the different mechanisms, tools and institutional arrangements 
(annual reports, meetings and supervision) that exist in the SNNPRS and the Cheha 
District to achieve the broader objective of the health system. Identifying the different 
mechanisms through which the Federal Ministry of Health and the SNNPRS Health 
Bureaus (principals) encourage the Health Bureaus at the District level (local agent) to 
achieve the objectives of the health system is also part of this research. 
 
There are various performance indicators in health sector reform reflecting the objective 
of access, equity, quality, effectiveness and efficiency. Studying health system 
performance is not the objective of this research. However, the research focused on 
analyzing the implication such a health service decentralization policy had on the access 
and equity objective of the health system and has been taken in account. Therefore the 
implication of health system decentralization for health service delivery by the Cheha 
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District health office at the local level has been assessed. Access here is defined as the 
presence or absence of physical or economic barriers that people might face in using 
health services12. The indicators for access include distance and time to the nearest health 
facility, transport for emergency medical cases, staff: population ratio, clinic hours and 
economic access. 
Equity in the health sector is defined as minimizing avoidable disparities in health 
services and its determinants between groups of people who have different levels of 
social advantage such as income/expenditure, occupation, wealth and education. 
Indicators for equity include availability of financing to pay, household burden of 
payment for health care and access to free services provided by voluntary organizations13. 
However, due to limitations both in finance and time, the researcher could not collect 
more data with regard to the equity and access objective of the health system and rather 
concentrated on the role of intergovernmental relations in health system decentralization. 
As far as the method of data collection is concerned, interviews and discussions in 
smaller group were carried out at different levels.  Staff of the Ministry of Health and 
staff of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development were part of the interviews 
and the discussions. Both of these ministerial offices are located in the capital city of the 
country, Addis Ababa. Interviews and group discussions were carried out also at the 
regional government level and the Regional Government Health Bureaus and the 
Regional Government Finance and Economic Development Bureaus participated. The 
spokesperson of the SNNPRS council was also interviewed. Awassa is the seat for the 
SNNPRS government and hence all the officers interviewed at the regional level are in 
                                                 
12 World Health Organization (WHO) 2000, p.250. 
13 WHO 2000, p.250. 
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Awassa. The interviews and group discussions were also carried out with important 
actors at the District level. Among such actors are the Cheha District Health Office and 
the District Finance Office located at the District Government seat called Emdibir. An 
interview was also conducted with representative of the Catholic Church health project 
which is a very important non-governmental organization in terms of health service 
delivery in the Cheha District. In addition to the interviews and group discussions, the 
researcher has studied secondary sources such as publications and documents, annual 
reports of government offices and policy documents relevant to the subject mater. 
1.6 Organization of the study 
The Mini-Thesis has the following six chapters. Following the introduction is chapter two 
which focuses on the theoretical overview of the field of decentralization, the different 
theoretical approaches, and concepts in the area of decentralization. The chapter therefore 
discusses the definition of decentralization, its goals and the different approaches to it. It 
also briefly explains the relationship between decentralization and service delivery and it 
discusses how the principal agent approach is used to explain the process of 
decentralization by taking a “decision space” approach. The concept of 
intergovernmental transfers, its use and character is also discussed in this chapter. The 
hypothesis, which is going to be tested empirically, is also discussed in this chapter 
followed by the last part that is the methodology.  
Chapter three deals with decentralization and health service delivery in Ethiopia in 
general and that of the SNNPRS and the Cheha District in particular and hence the first 
part gives brief information about Ethiopia, the SNNPRS and the Cheha District. The 
chapter also presents the decentralization exercised in Ethiopia and the country’s health 
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policy and governance. The last part of this chapter deals with the health profile of the 
country at a national level and that of the SNNPRS at regional level. 
 
In chapter four, the first part of the empirical findings is presented and it deals with 
principles governing fiscal decentralization in Ethiopia. This is followed by the second 
part which is intergovernmental transfers in Ethiopia in general and that of the SNNPRS 
in particular. This chapter also discusses the allocation of expenditure between different 
administrative levels and the last part of the chapter deals with the allocation of Woreda 
financial resources.  
Chapter five is a continuation of chapter four and hence discusses the findings of the 
empirical evidence and concentrates on assessing the important actors influencing the 
provision of health services by the Cheha District Health Office at different levels of 
government and the first part presents the circumstances around the Ethiopian Federal 
Ministry of Health, i.e. the way health service decentralization took place and the role of 
the ministry in the country’s health policy. This is followed by the second part on the 
Federal Ministry of Finance. Here the way the federal government assigns grants to 
different regional governments is discussed. The third and the fourth parts of this chapter 
are about the SNNPRS Health Bureaus and the region’s Finance Office followed by the 
Cheha District Health Office. The last part of the Thesis discusses the Cheha District 
Finance Office and the way budget is assigned for District sector offices including health. 
Chapter six is the last chapter of the Thesis and it deals with the conclusion made based 
on the research and this is followed by some recommendations. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework. 
2.1 What is Decentralization? 
The literature concerning decentralization since the 1950s has been full of different 
contradictory concepts. Sharing this same view, Dianna Conyers as quoted in Cohen 
/Peterson14 argued that there has been a lack of consensus among international 
development professionals, academics and senior government decision-makers on the 
definition of the concept of decentralization and, due to this, it was very difficult to carry 
out meaningful, comparative and empirical studies on decentralization. Decentralization 
is also described as a complex and often illusive phenomenon, a topic that receives much 
international attention but involving a lot of vague ideas so that there is  still much that is 
not known about it15. 
 
However, during the early 1980s, different scholars in the field of development came up 
with a number of crucial conceptual elaborations and definitions with regard to 
decentralization16.Though decentralization is said to be an illusive phenomenon, currently 
however there is a growing consensus with regard to the conceptual definitions of 
decentralization. 
 
Decentralization can be defined in many ways but, for the sake of this thesis, the 
definition of decentralization in its broader sense is selected as it is more useful to 
analyze the decentralization policy introduced in Ethiopia which is targeted to devolve all 
powers and resources to the District Governments. The growing role of NGOs and the 
                                                 
14 Cohen/ Peterson 1999. p.28. 
15 Smoke 2003. p.7. 
16 G.Shabbir Cheema, John R .Nellis Dennis. A Rondinelli are crucial scholars in the field of decentralization in 1980s 
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private sector demanded the transfer of authority and power of government to the private 
sector and NGOs and hence the definition of decentralization adopted in this thesis takes 
into account this fact. 
 
Decentralization therefore here is defined as “the transfer or delegation of legal and 
political authority and resources to plan, make decisions and manage public functions 
from central government and its agencies to field organizations and those agencies, 
subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous local governments or public 
corporations, area-wide or regional development authorities or functional authorities, 
autonomous local governments or non-governmental organizations”17. 
The above definition can be simplified as the transfer of power to local-level authorities 
and state enterprises. It incorporates all three forms of decentralization, including de-
concentration as a means of transferring administrative functions to subordinate sub-
national units; delegation as a means of transferring complex tasks and responsibilities to 
semi-independent authorities; and devolution as a transfer of power to sub-national 
political entities which are, via local/regional parliament or council, answerable to their 
electorates. The definition above does not go so far as to include privatization and other 
forms of economic decentralization, which follow a different logic compared to the 
redistribution of tasks and responsibilities within the governmental system. Accordingly, 
decentralization may incorporate one or all of the three dimensions of administrative, 
financial and political decentralization. 
 
                                                 
17 Cheema/Rondinelli 1983, p.18. 
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 However, recent international discussion on decentralization in the context of public 
sector reform has sparked lively discussion on the (new) role of the private sector. In this 
recent discussion, decentralization is defined in this context as "the transfer of authority 
and responsibility for public functions from the central government to subordinate or 
quasi-independent government organizations or the private sector"18. In this definition, 
economic decentralization is directly included. We have seen above the definition of 
decentralization and, in the next part, we will see the different approaches to classifying 
decentralization, which will help us to analyze the type of decentralization in Ethiopia. 
2.2 Types/Approaches of Decentralization 
Cheema, Nellis and Rondinelli’s approach to decentralization is based on the analytical 
classification of decentralization and hence it is called a type-function framework19. 
According to the type-function approach, decentralization should be classified according 
to its objectives and hence the different forms are political, spatial, market and 
administrative. 
A political form of decentralization which is used by political scientists is interested in 
democratization and civil societies. Identifying the transfer of decision-making power to 
the grass root level of governmental unit, citizen or their representative is the central 
point in political decentralization. Spatial decentralization is a term used by regional 
planners and geographers who are involved in the formulation of different policies and 
programs with regard to reduction of excessive urban concentration in some cities. 
Therefore promoting regional growth that has the potential to become a center for 
agricultural and manufacturing marketing is the central objective. Market forms of 
                                                 
18 Litvack and Seddon June 20   http://www.gtz.de/en/index.htminternet-team@gtz.de 
19 This part of the discussion is from John M. Cohen and Stephen B. Peterson 1999.pp.25-30. 
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decentralization which become more prevalent due to the recent trend towards 
liberalization and privatization are mainly used by economists to analyze and promote 
actions that facilitate creation of a situation by which goods and services are created and 
distributed by market mechanisms. The last but not the least is the administrative form of 
decentralization which is the interest of mainly lawyers and public administrative 
professionals. The central point here is the reform of hierarchy and functional distribution 
of powers and function between the central and local governmental units. Administrative 
decentralization has three sub-types and the first one is de-concentration which can be 
defined as the transfer of authority over specified decision-making but only within the 
jurisdictional authority of the central state. Devolution is the transfer of authority from 
the central government to the local level governments which are endowed with corporate 
status which is granted under state legislation. Federal states in general are devolved by 
definition while devolution is very much un-common in the case of unitary states. The 
last form of administrative decentralization is delegation which means the transfer of 
government decision-making and administrative authority for specific tasks to institutions 
and authorities which are independent or under the control of the central government20. 
 
Though the type–function approach is accepted by many scholars, it is not free from 
some criticism. Disciplinary and linguistic preferences are the basic problem that this 
framework faced. There are literatures to address this problem and hence a new 
framework which gave emphasis  to economic growth, financial incapacity of the state, 
spatial concentration of development and bureaucratic reforms was being developed, 
                                                 
20 John M. Cohen and Stephen B. Peterson 1996. p.29. 
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based on concepts and words which are neutral with regard to discipline and language 
group.  
2.3 Goals of Decentralization and Its Relation to Service Delivery 
It is argued that decentralization has many goals and some of these are complex. It is 
important to review the goals of a decentralization policy as it will enable the analyzing 
of the goals of the health service decentralization which took place in Ethiopia in general 
and in the SNNPRS in particular. 
 
There are many potential and often conflicting goals of decentralization while 
improvement in efficiency, governance and /or equity in the public service delivery 
process and outcomes are the major ones21. These goals of decentralization can be 
referred to as direct goals. According to a World Bank report, decentralization holds great 
promise for improving delivery of public services but outcomes depend on its design and 
on the institutional arrangements governing its implementation22.  
There are goals of decentralization which can be referred as indirect since they are not the 
direct goal or aim of decentralization. Such indirect goals include different hidden 
agendas of local and central governments.  
2.3.1 Direct goals of decentralization  
The direct goal of decentralization in general includes a more efficient delivery of 
services, innovation through experimentation and adaptation of local conditions. Greater 
equity through distribution of resources, improved quality, transparency, accountability, 
                                                 
21 United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs 2004.p.2. 
22 World Bank 2001.p.1. 
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and legitimacy due to user oversight and participation in decision-making are said to be 
also the direct goals of a decentralized policy23. 
 2.3.1.1 Efficiency 
According to the proponents of decentralization, improved efficiency is one of the 
potential advantages of decentralization. This is because people are different within a 
country and they have different needs of public services and sub-national governments 
are said to be near to the people, have better access to local information and understand 
the local context well. If this is the case then they can better identify the type and level of 
services that their constituents need than those at higher level and hence finally will 
improve efficiency.  
However there are certain services which local people want that may best be provided at 
greater scale by a higher level government for macroeconomic stability and some may 
affect other jurisdictions and hence should not be left to the control of one single local 
government24. Economists also justify decentralization based on a locative efficiency. 
The main argument here is that decisions concerning public expenditure that are taken by 
the grass- root level government, which is more responsible to the local constituency, and  
is more likely to reflect the demand for local service than similar decisions taken by a 
remote central government. Here, it is further said, people are more willing to pay for 
services which are their priorities and particularly for those services which are the 
outcomes of people’s participation in decision making processes with regard to  service 
delivery25.    
                                                 
23 Thomas J Bossert and Joel C Beauvais 2002, p.16. 
24 World Bank,Jjune,2005, www.ciesin.org/decentralization/ English/General/Rational.html 
25 World Bank Thematic Team, June 2005. 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
2.3.1.2 Good Governance 
Improved governance is also one of the potential advantages of decentralization and this 
is due to the belief of people that their interaction with elected local governments will 
lead to decisions which are most consistent with their wishes than those made by those at 
higher levels. This is  because people will feel that they are better connected to local 
governments if the people are able to influence public affairs in at least some modest 
ways that directly affect them, empowering people and giving them a sense of control 
and autonomy. However, there are exceptions to this point since governance and 
collective actions are not purely local; people do not necessarily have to have everything 
they want when key national goals must takes precedence over local needs. 
2.3.1.3 Equity 
Improved equity is the other goal of decentralization and if local governments are 
familiar with local circumstances, this might help them to be in a position to distribute 
public resources equitably and target poverty within their own jurisdictions. Internal 
resources might be a constraint here but the redistribution from richer areas to poorer 
areas must be the responsibility of the central government.26 Some jurisdictions are better 
endowed with resources than others, perhaps because of size or location. In addition, 
historical circumstances (e.g., apartheid) may have created regional or local differences. 
Thus, an intergovernmental fiscal program through decentralization may be designed to 
shift resources to disadvantaged areas to ensure that all citizens enjoy a minimum level of 
service, regardless of location, or receive enhanced assistance to accelerate amelioration 
of deficits, because of location27. 
 2.3.2. Indirect Goals of Decentralization 
The indirect goals of decentralization are mainly associated with what Smoke calls the 
more “ambitious”28 medium and long- term goals of stronger economic development and 
poverty reduction. This indirect goal of decentralization also includes the hidden political 
                                                 
26 United Nations department of social and economic affairs 2004, p.2. 
27 World Bank thematic team June 2005. 
28 World Bank 2001, p.1. 
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interest of a given government. Sharing the same view, one report from the World Bank 
noted that much of the decentralization that happened in the past was motivated by 
political concern. It is argued that decentralization in Latin American countries, for 
example, has been a very important part of the democratization process as the central 
regimes are changed by elected governments. The spread of multi-party political systems 
is quoted as the main reason for the demand for a stronger local voice in decision-making 
and this in return motivated decentralization in Africa .In some African countries like 
Ethiopia, decentralization was considered as a response to pressure either from regional 
or ethnic groups for greater political control and participation while, in the case of 
Mozambique and Uganda, decentralization came about as an outcome of  a long civil 
war,  providing political opportunities at the local level and enabling greater participation 
of all former warring fractions29. Decentralization in the transition economies of former 
socialist countries happened due to the fall of the old central apparatus, and the absence 
of any other meaningful alternative structure of governance to provide local government 
service is the other reason for massive decentralization in different countries.  
2.3.3. Goals of Decentralization in the Health Sector. 
Decentralization in the health sector can be discussed as a process which involves a 
variety of mechanisms to transfer fiscal and administrative, ownership and/or political 
authority for health service delivery from the central Ministry of Health (MOH) to 
alternate institutions. Hence, in the health sector, decentralization has been promoted as a 
key means of improving health sector performance and the main argument with regard to 
its relation with service delivery is that the policy of decentralization has a potential to 
improve the locative efficiency by allowing the mix of services and expenditure to be 
shaped by local user preferences. It will also improve the technical efficiency through 
greater cost consciousness at the local level. 
                                                 
29 World Bank 2001.p.1. 
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Decentralization theory therefore argues that services should be decentralized if demand 
and supply conditions are highly localized as in the case of primary health care. Local 
benefits include improved health and productivity in specific jurisdiction and reflect the 
local nature of demand30. 
It is argued that health sector governance and popular participation at the local level are 
important elements of decentralization in the health sector. This is because the influence 
held by different stakeholders over the decision process could express the priorities of the 
local people and then also address issues for  locative efficiency. The other goal of 
decentralization in the health sector is that of providing a means of holding the local 
health staff accountable for higher quality care. Community participation and the capacity 
of the local governments in managing health service delivery are therefore important in 
health sector decentralization31. 
2.4. The Principal-Agent Approach 
The following section of the thesis reviews the principal-agent approach, one of the 
frameworks that is used in the recent literature of decentralization, particularly within the 
health sector.  
“When two parties agree to work together within a hierarchy or on a lateral basis, they 
invoke a kind of contractual relationship”. If the relationship is bilateral as in the case of 
a buyer and seller, the seller normally carries out the task assigned by the buyer and 
hence, in this case, the seller is called the agent while the buyer is the principal. The 
principal is mainly concerned about the achievement of the task assigned to the agent. On 
the other hand, the agent is primarily interested in receiving remuneration in return for 
                                                 
30 Matthew Andrews and Larry Schroeder 2003.p.2. 
31 Thomas J Bossert and Joel C Beauvais 2002, p.24. 
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the accomplishment of the task. The agent seeks to maximize his or her returns, subject to 
the constraints and incentives offered by the principal32. The principal conversely seeks 
to structure the relationship with the agent so that the outcome produced through the 
agent’s efforts are the best the principal can achieve, given the decision to delegate in the 
first place. There is, then, a natural conflict of interest between the two33. 
 
The principal–agent theory proposes principals who are either individuals or institutions 
with specific objectives, and agents who are needed to implement activities to achieve 
those objectives. The agents may share some of the objectives of the principal; however, 
they might also have other interests such as increasing their own income or shrinking it. 
Agents have also more information about what they are doing than the principal, giving 
them an advantage and allowing them to pursue their own interests at the expense of that 
of the principal’s. The principal might be interested in overcoming this information of the 
agent’s but gaining information might be either costly or even impossible. The principal 
seeks to achieve his goals by shaping incentives that are in line with the agent’s own 
interests. Selective monitoring and punishments to encourage agents are also used by the 
principal to implement activities to achieve the given objectives. In this approach, it is 
assumed that the principal receives the benefits of any profit that is produced by the 
agents. In addition to the information asymmetry, the principal-agent theory also focuses 
on issues of control of information and monitoring34. 
 
                                                 
32 Mc Cubbins and Kiewiet 1991,p.24.(as quoted by Kusnanto) 
33 Hari Kusnanto from the Internet June,2005 www.hsph.harvard.edu/takemi/RP198  
34 Bossert, 1998.p.6. 
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The principal-agent approach was developed by economists primarily to examine choices 
made by managers of private corporations. It has also been used to analyze federal 
intergovernmental transfers to states in the United States. Recently, sociologists also used 
it to analyze the relationship between provider and patient in the health sector35. 
The theory was developed also to explain the relationship between private contractual 
parties such as landlords and tenants or owners and managers. The theory however was 
utilized in describing bureaucratic and public institutions. The central and local 
governments provide an example of a hierarchical power structure, in which the central 
government (the principal) has the right to write contracts in a centralized system and the 
local government or district health office (agent) has to accept the contracts, although it 
may be allowed to give some input into the contractual agreements.36 
One of the crucial issues in decentralization is the appropriateness of power structures 
among the central and local parties37. Bossert, who discuss decentralization as the 
expansion of decision choices at the local level, applied the principal-agent approach to 
the health system and viewed the Ministry of Health as a principal, with the objectives of 
equity, efficiency, quality and financial soundness. He also considered the local health 
authorities as agents who are given resource to implement the general policies in 
achieving the above objectives. The principal-agent theory, which is said to encourage 
examination of how the principal monitors, performs and shapes incentives and 
punishment, was used by Bossert to develop a symmetrical framework for research on the 
decentralization of health systems and hence the following part discusses the application 
of this theory to health sector decentralization. 
                                                 
35 Bossert 1998. p.6. 
36 Hari Kusnanto from the Internet June,2005 www.hsph.harvard.edu/takemi/RP198 
37Hari Kusnanto from the Internet June,2005 www.hsph.harvard.edu/takemi/RP198 
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2.5: Models for Analysis of Decentralization of Health Systems 
 In order to assess the implications of decentralization on health service delivery, this part 
of the thesis focuses on a crucial framework which can be used to analyze the 
decentralization of the health system. Decentralization of the health system has been 
studied by Bossert using a “decision-space” approach. “Decision-space” refers to the 
amount of decision-making authority transferred to local officials for the execution of 
health services38. The decision-space approach is based on the theory of principal-agent 
which is discussed above and Bossert used a comparative analytical tool called the 
“decision-space map”. 
 
The unique features and strength of the decision-space approach is that it clearly provides 
a framework which enables us to measure the three basic elements of decentralization: 1) 
the amount of choice transferred from central institutions to institutions at the periphery 
of the health system, 2) the choices local officials make with increased discretion and, 3), 
the effect these choices have on the performance of health system39. 
 
The objective of the decision-space approach is therefore to begin to draw lessons about 
how to design more effective processes of decentralization and to clearly identify the 
ways in which reforms in the health sector affect local health sector decision-makers and 
the range of choices available to them in the various spheres of health service 
management. It also allows exploring of the level and type of decisions taken at the 
different tiers of government and how such decision-space influence health service 
delivery at local level. This will also enable one to assess the implications of 
                                                 
38Thomas J Bossert 1998, p.17. 
39 Thomas J Bossert 1998, p.17. 
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decentralization on the performance of the health system in achieving objectives of 
equity, efficiency, quality and financial soundness40. The analytical framework that is 
used here is therefore based on the principal–agent approach and, in this perspective, the 
Ministry of Health is the “principal” and hence sets the goals and parameters for health 
policy and programs. This principal grants authority and resources to local “agents” 
which includes municipal and regional governments, decentralized field offices or 
autonomous institutions for implementation of its objective41. 
 
According to the principal-agent approach, local agents often have their own preference 
for the mix of activities and expenditure to be undertaken, and respond to a local set of 
stakeholders and constituents that may have different priorities than the national 
principal. This means local institutions may have to evade the mandate established by the 
central government. Bossert further argues that since agents have better information 
about their own activities than does the principal, they have some margin within which to 
change or shirk centrally defined responsibilities and pursue their own agendas. Since the 
cost of the principal of acquiring information is often prohibitively high, according to 
Bossert, the central government seeks to achieve its objective through the establishment 
of incentives and sanctions that effectively guide agent behavior without making losses 
both in efficiency and innovation. Different mechanisms are used to achieve this 
objective and this includes monitoring and reporting, inspections, performance reviews, 
contracts and grants42. 
 
                                                 
40 Thomas J Bossert and Joel C Beauvais 2002, pp.18-21. 
41 Thomas J Bossert and Joel C Beauvais 2002, pp.18-21. 
42 Thomas J Bossert, 1998, p.19. 
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Bossert further argues that the principal may use different mechanisms through which it 
can influence the agents. This includes broadening the formal “decision-space” or range 
of choice available to local agents within the various functions of finance, service 
organizations, human resources, targeting and governance. Here it is noted that the 
central principal transfers formal authority to the agents in a voluntarily way so as to 
promote its health policy objective. The level and nature of the transfer differs from case 
to case. However, it shapes the functioning of the principal-agent relationship and the 
characteristics of the decentralized system as a whole43. 
 
To put it in a nutshell, Bossert argues that decentralization should not be seen as an end  
in itself, but rather as a means to an end of accomplishing the goals of equity, efficiency, 
quality and access to health care. His model clearly allows analyzing each area of the 
decentralization of the health system such as finance, service organizations, human 
resources and the like. Bossert’s approach to decentralization should therefore provide a 
useful model of analysis that separates the decision making process for fiscal 
decentralization from that of health service administration and human resource 
management. This is crucial for analysis of any health system as differences in these four 
areas of the decentralization of a health system are clearly identified which could 
potentially affect health outcomes. Bossert’s model also ranks degrees of decision-
making authority as narrow, moderate and wide for each area of a decentralized health 
system44. 
 
                                                 
43 Thomas J Bossert, 1998, p.19. 
44 Amy Nunn 2005, p.5. 
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The allocation decision made by the central authorities toward the decentralized entities 
will influence the relation of the principal and agent respectively. Health sector finance, 
both at its absolute level and its distribution, is crucial to effective health service delivery 
and hence the following part of the paper revises intergovernmental transfers. 
2.6 Intergovernmental Transfers 
There are different important concepts which can determine the relation of the central 
government with sub-national or local governments with regard to service delivery by 
local governments, and an intergovernmental transfer is the basic concept. Sharing the 
same view, one report from the World Bank noted that intergovernmental transfers are 
the dominant source of revenue for sub-national governments in most developing 
countries. The design of these transfers is of critical importance for efficiency and equity 
of local service provision and the fiscal health of sub-national governments45. 
 
2.6.1 Use of Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
There are many justifications given for intergovernmental fiscal transfers and one of them 
is that of addressing vertical differences. Due to the insufficient revenue-raising power of 
local governments, they are not able to cover the cost of services which they are supposed 
to provide and intergovernmental transfers can help to cover this vertical gap or 
differences. The other reason is that of bringing about horizontal equalization. It is very 
common that the ability of local governments or regional states varies from region to 
region. This might be due to the existing differences in resource endowments of the 
different regional states. And, since local governments are responsible for financing 
public services through their own local resources unless there is an intergovernmental 
                                                 
45 World Bank,,june,2005, www.ciesin.org/decentralization/ English/General/Rational.html 
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transfer, there will be a difference in the provisions of local services both in quality and 
quantity which might bring about a problem even at the macroeconomic level. Sub-
national fiscal capacity differences therefore can be minimized by intergovernmental 
transfers46. 
 
The other reason for intergovernmental transfers is to correct inter-jurisdictional 
spillovers or externalities. Sometimes a service produced by one local government might 
positively or negatively affect other local governments. Some local government services 
might generate inter-jurisdictional spillovers which might be either benefit or cost, which 
might affect others too. Local governments might not be willing to provide some of the 
services in a very efficient way if they believe that other local governments might benefit 
from those services. Under such conditions, central government may transfer resources to 
local governments so that they will be spent only on services that generate spillovers and 
this is just to ensure that the local government provides a greater amount of services. 
Intergovernmental transfers will also be used to correct major administrative weaknesses 
and streamline bureaucracy. The idea here is that centralizing the management of certain 
taxes will increase administrative efficiency. Local governments can also levy some taxes 
which are clearly reserved by the central government, but there are taxes which are likely 
to be well and efficiently managed through a central administration tax system than a 
fragmented system. Hence such taxes are often collected nationally and redistributed to 
local governments through a transfer system47.  
2.6.2 Criteria for Intergovernmental Transfers 
                                                 
46 Smoke 2001, p.24. 
47 Smoke, 2001, p.25. 
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It is true that intergovernmental transfers are the dominant sources of revenue for sub-
national governments in most developing countries and hence the design of such transfers 
is very important for the efficiency and equity of local service provision, particularly for 
the fiscal health of sub-national governments48The transfer system therefore highly 
affects the activities of local governments and hence highlights those points which help to 
evaluate a given transfer system. Autonomy is the first criterion and hence devolved 
governments should have complete independence and flexibility in setting priorities, and 
should not be constrained by the categorical structure of programs and uncertainty 
associated with decision-making at the center. Tax-base sharing, allowing sub-national 
governments to introduce their own tax rates on central bases, and formula-based revenue 
sharing is consistent with this objective. Revenue adequacy is the second criterion and 
hence sub-national governments should have adequate revenues to discharge designated 
responsibilities. Equity is the other criterion and this  means that allocated funds should 
vary directly with fiscal need factors and be inverse to the taxable capacity of each 
province49. 
 
The grant50 mechanism should ensure predictability of sub-national governments’ shares 
by publishing projections of funding availability. The grant design should be also neutral 
with respect to sub-national governments’ choices of resource allocation to different 
sectors or different types of activities. Simplicity is also the other important criterion and 
hence the sub-national government’s allocation should be based on objective factors over 
which individual units have little control. The formula should be also easy to 
                                                 
48 World Bank, 2005, www.ciesin.org/ decentralization. 
49 World Bank june,2005, www.ciesin.org/decentralization/ English/General/Rational.html 
50 Grant here is just used as having the same meaning as intergovernmental transfers. 
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comprehend51.Incentive is also the other crucial point and hence the proposed design 
should provide incentives for sound fiscal management and discourage inefficient 
practices. Last but not least is the fact that grant design should ensure that certain well-
defined objectives of the donor are properly adhered to by the grant recipients. This is 
accomplished by proper monitoring, joint progress reviews, and by providing technical 
assistance, or by designing a selective matching transfer program.  It is also argued that 
the various criteria specified above could be in conflict with each other and therefore a 
grantor may have to assign priorities to various factors in comparing policy alternatives. 
 
Smoke argues that the capacity of a grant to provide and promote legitimate local 
spending needs is important in the flow of resources from the center to the local 
governments. If a given transfer system is designed to enable and ensure local 
governments to have enough resources to cover their unmet revenue needs and when 
there is an appropriate growth of the transferred resources with need over time, then it 
can be said that the transfer system mats the criteria of revenue adequacy and growth.  
Fiscal planning needs certainty with regard to the flow of resources from the center. 
Therefore sub-national governments should know the amount of money and other 
resources that they will receive for the coming fiscal year before they start working on 
the planning and budgeting process. This will help local governments to make future 
plans and minimize large swings in resource availability. The volume of transfers should 
also be predictable for local governments and this will help them to plan and budget in a 
                                                 
51World Bank,,june,2005, www.ciesin.org/decentralization/ English/General/Rational.html 
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stable way from year to year. The transfer made to local governments should be 
distributed for their use and it must be also timely52. 
 
There are three different policy issues related to the mechanism by which funds are 
transferred from one government to another. Hence intergovernmental transfers need to 
make clear how to decide the total amount of resources that are going to be distributed, 
how to allocate the resources across the sub-national governments and whether to restrict 
or not with regard to how the transfer funds can be used. However, for the sake of this 
thesis, I will discuss the second policy issue, that is, the way funds are allocated among 
different local governments.  
 
With regard to how to allocate funds among sub-national governments, there are different 
approaches and the first of such approaches is that tax-sharing transfers return to a 
particular sub-national government either all or a portion of the tax collected by the 
central government in the jurisdiction of the given sub-national government. The second 
type of transfers is those allocated on the basis of objectively defined formulas. Such 
transfer approaches are becoming very popular through time as they meet some of the 
main evaluative criteria such as transparency. Such transfer approaches are transparent 
for the recipient governments and also help the granting government considerable 
position in determining which objectives of the transfer mechanism need to be 
emphasized. However, in many developing countries, there is a lack of adequate and 
timely data which is required to implement the allocation formula. It is also common in 
such developing countries to see a tendency of trying to achieve many objectives with a 
                                                 
52 Smoke 2001, p. 26. 
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single transfer program and, according to Smoke, especially in the case of Ethiopia, many 
indicators are being added to the formula. Subsidization is also another way of making 
transfers. Here such type of cost-sharing can be of two types and these are either total or 
partial cost-sharing. Subsidization needs to have very clear reasons otherwise it will 
distort the budget of the recipient government53. 
 
The other important point here is the degree of sub national spending autonomy and this 
means the extent of autonomy which given recipients, sub-national governments, exercise 
with regard to utilizing the funds from the transfer instrument. Greater sub-national 
autonomy means lesser control by the central government with regard to use of funds. In 
case of general purpose allocations, local governments have full autonomy over the 
utilization of transferred funds. The recipient jurisdiction can allocate the money for any 
purpose it desires, be it labor or non-labor input. According to the proponents of 
decentralization, such powers are very close to full devolution of spending powers. 
Sectorally limited block allocation also permits the recipient government to choose how 
the fund is going to be used but in a limited sector only. In the case of purpose-specific 
transfer, it can be very restrictive in terms of how the funds are spent. The restriction 
might apply for choices between labor and non-labor input and/or for particular spending 
plans. Here the development project grant will be sent based on the provisions of the 
project submitted by the local council while the central ministry has the right to approve 
or disapprove it54. 
 
                                                 
53 Smoke, 2001, p.27. 
54 Smoke, 2001, p.27. 
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We have seen in the above discussion the different criteria and concepts which should be 
considered in a transfer system. This is also the case in the health sector financial 
transfers and, in the Ethiopian case, the health finance transfer system from the center 
that is the MOH to the sub-national governments influences health service provision by 
the local governments. The intergovernmental transfer discussed above will therefore 
help in explaining the level and type of decision-making power of both the regional 
government and the district government and how this decision-space is influenced by the 
relations within government. Decisions concerning the health finance transfer from the 
center that is the Ministry of Health (MOH) to the local governments, in this case the 
Cheha district health bureaus, will also be assessed. 
2.7 Hypothesis 
 
The previous part of the thesis introduced the different mechanisms by which the 
principal, which is the Ministry of Health (MOH), influences the agents, that is, local 
governments, and these include broadening the range of choice of local agents by 
decentralization among the functions of finance, service organization, human resource, 
access rules and governance rules. This will determine the implementation of the 
objectives of the principal, which is the efficient and effective provision of health 
services. We have also seen how the transfer system can influence the relation ship of the 
central and local governments with regard to service delivery. 
 
As it might not be possible to analyze the decentralization of the health services in 
Ethiopia and its implication for public health delivery in all the functions mentioned 
above, and the fact that health sector finance  is a very important factor in explaining the 
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relation of the Ministry of Health to the sub-national governments in Ethiopia, this thesis 
will focus only on one specific area - the health sector finance transferred from the 
Ministry of Health to the local entities determining the efficient allocation of health 
service delivery by local governments. 
 
The hypothesis will therefore consider the implication of health service decentralization 
for the provision of health services by local governments, taking the Cheha district as a 
case. As was discussed above, researchers in the field argue that the decentralization of 
the health system among other things depends on the range of choice of local agents 
among the other requirements  of finance, service organization, human resource, access 
rules and governance rules. However, taking in to account the decentralization of the 
health system in Ethiopia, the researcher believes that the range of choice of local 
governments with regard to health sector finance has more implications for health service 
delivery by local governments. Hence the effective and efficient provision of health 
service by local governments in Ethiopia among other things, as in the case of other 
countries55, depends on the following three important factors: 1) the distribution of health 
spending, 2) the sources of income and fiscal autonomy, and 3), local discretion in 
expenditure decisions56. 
                                                 
55 Thomas J Bossert, 1998, p.24. 
56 Thomas J Bossert, 1998, p.24. 
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CAPTER 3: Descriptive Background and Context 
 
3.1 Decentralization and Health Service Delivery in SNNPRS and the Cheha 
district. 
 
The main objective of this Chapter is to test the hypothesis against the findings of the 
field research and hence the structure is the continuation of the hypothesis. This Chapter 
is further divided in to three sub-chapters. General background information about 
Ethiopia is contained in the first part followed by the second part which gives general 
background information and introduces the SNNPRS and the Cheha district including 
their history and administrative structure. The third part is about the decentralization 
policy in Ethiopia and the health policy and governance of the country. This is followed 
by the last part of this Chapter which is the health sector profile both at the national and 
regional level. 
3.1.1 Background Information on Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa covering an area of around 1.1 million square 
kilometers. It shares borders with Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia. Ethiopia is a 
Federal Democratic Republic with a bicameral parliament: the House of Representatives 
and the House of Federation. The administrative boundaries within the country have 
changed three times since mid-1970s and currently the country has nine regional states 
and these are: Tigray, Afar, Oromia, Somalia, Benishangul gumuz, Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS), Gambella and Harrari and two  
administrative cities (Addis Ababa and Dire- dawa).The National Regional States and 
city administration are further divided into 551 woredas (districts).  A district is the basic 
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decentralized administrative unit having an administrative council composed of elected 
members. The 551 districts are further divided in to roughly 15,000 rural and urban 
kebeles, the smallest administrative unit in the country.         
 
Ethiopia’s total population in 2004 was estimated to be 69.1 million57 and with an 
average growth rate of 2.7%, it is expected to reach 81.2 million by 2009. Above 85%of 
Ethiopians live in rural areas, making the country one of the least urbanized countries in 
the world.  43.5% of the population is younger than 15 years of age, and 51.9% of the 
population is between 15 to 59 years of age while those above 60 years of age comprises 
only 4.6% of the total population. Since almost the vast majority of the population living 
in the rural part of the country depends on agriculture, in order to ensure national 
development, it is necessary to maintain and improve the health status of the rural 
population. Average population density is 52.2 persons per square kilometers with 
substantial variations among regions and hence population densities are higher in the 
highland than the eastern and southern lowlands. 
 
Ethiopia, with an estimated per capita income of USD100 is one of the least developed 
countries in the world. Around 47% of the total population lives below the poverty line 
and, accordingly, the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) for Ethiopia is 0.309 and, 
when this index is adjusted for gender differences, it drops to 0.297, which reflects the 
gender inequalities. 
                                                 
57 Central Statistics Authority (CSA), 1994 Population and housing census. 
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Rapid population growth, poor economic performance and educational levels exasperate 
the economic development of the country and all this has an impact on health status. The 
literacy rate,  estimated to be 29%, is also very low. 
3.2 The SNNPRS and the Cheha district 
 
Art 1 of the 2001 revised constitution of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ 
Regional State proclaims the establishment of the SNNPRS and hence the SNNPR, 
established in 1992, is one of the nine regional states and two urban administrations in the 
country58. The region is located in the South bordered by Kenya in the south, Sudan in 
the southwest, the Gambela59 region in the west and Oromia60 region in the north, 
northeast and east. The region is organized into 13 zones61 and 104 woredas62.Hence, the 
SNNPRS is among the widest regional states of Ethiopia. The SNNPRS is a unification 
of four regional states and they become one for the sake of administrative and political 
reasons. There are more than 45 ethnic groups in the region and the region is the worst in 
terms of development when  compared to other regional states of the country. The map 
below shows the administrative structure of the regional state and also the location of the 
Cheha district in the regional state.  
                                                 
58 The Revised Constitution, 2001of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Regional State. 
59 Gambela is one of the regional states in Ethiopia. 
60 Orromia is also one of the regional states of Ethiopia with more than 40%of the whole population of the country. 
61 Zone is a middle level administrative unit which coordinate, organize and follow up the activities of woredas. 
62 Woreda is the local language for the district level administrative unit of the government. 
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                                                        Source: UNDP-EUE 1996 
 
The region has an area of 118,000 sq km, which consists of 10% of the total area of the 
country.   
According to the population projection done on the 2004/5 census, the region had an 
estimated population of 14,484,000  in 2004/05, which was 20% of the total national 
population. The central, eastern and northeastern parts of the region are densely 
populated with 92 persons per sq km. The southern and southwestern parts of the region 
are sparsely populated areas with a predominantly nomadic population.  According to the 
census, more than 93.5% of the population is rural while the remaining 6.5% is urban. 
4.26% of the population are children under the age of one, while children younger  than 
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five years  make up 18.87% of the total population. Women of childbearing age (15-45) 
comprise 23.76% of the population, of which 4.26% are pregnant women. 50.9% of the 
population (15-64 years of age) is within the productive age, which indicates that almost 
half of the population is economically dependent. 
 
The region’s economy is based on agriculture, with substantial crop production resulting 
in a very poor standard of living in the rural community.  20% of foreign currency is 
generated through the export of leather and hides and coffee production. 
 
The SNNPRS is one of the regions well known for its more than 56 nations and 
nationalities, languages and cultural diversity. More than 50% of the country’s languages 
and cultural heritages are found in the SNNPRS. The languages spoken in the region are 
classified under four language families: Omotic, Cushitic, Semitic, and Nilotic63.  
 
The Cheha district is therefore one of the districts in the SNNPRS and the people are 
called the Guraghes. Cheha woreda is around 44072 square meters area wise and the 
district is located at 1200-2600 meter above sea level. 60% of the district land is  plateau 
while 40% is highlands. As far as the weather is concerned, 20% of the district is cold, 
70% medium and 9% very hot or arid. The woreda has subsistence agriculture which 
depends on rain and the main rain season is from June to September each year. 
 
                                                 
63 Interview with Fikre,15,9,2005 
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Coming to the administrative structure of the district, the Cheha district is subdivided into 
39 lower administrative units called kebele64 and the kebeles have 134 sub-kebeles and 
511 government representative groups. The overall  population of the Cheha district is 
estimated to be 178 249 and among this 87 042 are male while the rest,  91 201, are 
female. According to one report from the district, the district shows 2.9% economic 
growth, though there is no sound research conducted to conclude this. 
3.3. Decentralization, Health policy and governance in Ethiopia 
 
This part of the thesis deals with the decentralization policy introduced in Ethiopia, how 
decentralization is used as an instrument in the health sector and the governance of the 
health policy of the country. 
3.3.1 Decentralization in Ethiopia 
Ethiopian policy-makers argue that the country’s experience has shown that where there 
is no political order, there can be no development; and where that order is not based on 
democratic principles, there can be no sustainable development65. And hence, in 
principle, it is said that democratic governance, taken in its broadest sense, is a necessary 
condition for development. Although democratic systems of government vary in their 
forms, structures and institutions, they are predicated on common principles based on the 
will of the people expressed in regular free and fair elections, limited powers of 
government, and an independent judiciary to protect individual rights, the constitution 
and the laws. There are also additional attributes of democratic government. Among these 
are government accountability to citizens, transparency of government procedures and 
                                                 
64 The lowest administrative unit of locale government 
65 Regionalization and decentralization in Ethiopia: policies and implementation, an abstract by Kifle Wedajo 
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operations, and citizens’ participation in all levels of government, especially at the local 
level. 
Decentralization of political powers is therefore considered one of the attributes of 
Ethiopia’s democratization. This policy has had, and continues to have, positive impacts 
on several dimensions of development. The main objective of the government in 
introducing decentralization were therefore enabling people to participate directly in the 
management of their affairs so that people become development-oriented, to make local 
administration more accountable and responsible, and to improve local services such as 
health, education and agricultural extension by allowing local governments to have local 
control of allocated taxes and revenues66.  
The type of decentralization dominant in Ethiopia is devolution and this, among other 
things, incorporates the shift of expenditure assignment, fiscal decentralization and the 
prevalence of decentralized elected councils at all level  of government. Power is 
devolved to the nine regional governments and two city administrations and then the 
government started what it referred to as the second wave of decentralization, and this  
was the decentralization of power to the districts (woredas) and this was only since 2002. 
The primary objective of the decentralization is to deepen the process for empowering 
communities to initiate and control their development activities and enhance the scope 
and quality of the delivery of basic services such as health. Currently, most districts have 
access to decision-making powers. 
 
                                                 
66 Kifle Wedajo, 1995:1. 
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The constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE, 2002) clearly 
defines the powers and functions of the federal government and regional governments. It 
also reveals the separation of state power, checks and balances, and transparency and 
accountability among different government organs. The federal constitution  therefore 
provides the broader framework for policy formulation. Policies are initiated in 
consultation with decentralized governments and participation of the public which are 
then discussed and approved by the constituents. Similarly, based on the constitution of 
FDRE, each regional state promulgated its regional constitution in 2002, taking into 
account the objective reality of the region and the aim to achieve rapid economic 
development, enhanced democracy, and lasting peace and security.  
 
Decentralization therefore has been the main policy of the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia since the early 1990s and, according to the constitution, the regional states 
have significant expenditure power and responsibilities together with certain revenue 
collection power. Tax responsibilities are explicitly stated for each level of government67. 
3.3.2. Health Policy and Governance in Ethiopia 
Over the past decades, the government of Ethiopia has initiated a comprehensive 
economic reform program which includes health as one of its sectors. Accordingly, the 
country adopted a new economic policy which is aimed at establishing a market-based 
economic transformation, and the strengthening of social services such as education, 
health, investment in roads and water resource through privatization. 
 
                                                 
67 Referto the part “allocation of expenditure between different administrative levels”. 
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According to a report from MOH, the government of Ethiopia68 has issued a health policy 
which is based on commitment to democracy, empowerment of people that emanates 
from democracy and to decentralization as a very crucial instrument of the government. 
The report further noted that the Ethiopian government’s health policy places a strong 
emphasis on the fulfillment of the needs of the less privileged rural population which 
constitutes 85% of the total population in the country. 
 
The Ethiopian government’s health policy, therefore, mainly focuses on the 
decentralization and democratization of the health system, development of preventive and 
promotive health services, ensuring access to health to the whole population, promoting 
inter-sectoral collaboration by involving NGOs and the private sector, and promoting and 
enhancing national self-reliance in health development. 
 
According to the MOH report, the health policy of Ethiopia identified the priority 
intervention areas and strategies to be employed to achieve the health policy objectives, 
and it is stated that the government policy on decentralization is the most significant 
policy influencing the design and implementation of the health policy in Ethiopia. Within 
the health sector, primary responsibility in delivering services including management is 
devolved to the regional Health bureaus (RHBs) and, since 2003, the management of the 
health system and the responsibility of service delivery are devolved to district (woreda) 
level. It should be noted that increasing local decision-making and participation aimed at 
strengthening ownership in the planning and management of social services is the 
                                                 
68 FDRE,MOH: Accelerated Expansion of primary health care coverage in Ethiopia,2004,Adiss Ababa 
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primary objective of the political, administrative and economic decentralization policy to 
woreda or district level69. 
 
As a result of the health care decentralization in Ethiopia, the decision-making processes 
both in the development and implementation of the health system are shared between the 
Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH) and the regional health bureaus (RHBs) and the 
woreda health office (WHOs). Recently,  some measures were taken by the government 
and hence the FMOH and the RHBs were made to focus more on the area of policy and 
technical support while the woreda health offices have beenmade  responsible for 
managing and coordinating of the primary health care facilities at the woreda level. 
 
Therefore the administrative structure of Ethiopia has been set to incorporate the federal 
government, regions, the woredas and kebeles70. However, there are some regional states 
with zone-level administrative units but the government says that these zone-level units 
are temporary and with limited functions such as giving logistical support and overseeing 
the zonal hospitals. The next part of the thesis introduces the Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS) and the Cheha district which are the 
focus of the thesis. 
 
 
                                                 
69 See Chapter six for the details concerning the power and responsibility of the Federal, Regional and woreda health 
offices. 
70  Kebele is the lowest administrative unit at the bottom of the overall administrative structure next to the woreda 
level. A kebele has an estimated population of 5000 or about 1000 households. 
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3.4 Health sector profile 
3.4.1 National health profile 
 
Ethiopia is amongst the least developed countries in the world with regard to economic 
development and standard of living.  Some scholars claim that the basic cause for this 
poverty is the predominant backward economic system and outlook as well as the man-
made and natural disasters that occurred over many years in the past . Therefore it should 
be borne in mind that health and other social problems are a reflection of the already 
existing backwardness. More than about 47% of the population of Ethiopia therefore 
lives below the poverty line. 
 
The country has an area of 1.12 million sq. km. with a population density of 52 people 
per sq. km with great variation among the regions. According to the 2004 census 
estimated total population of the country was 71.07 million with an average annual 
growth rate of 2.7%.  43.5% of the population is under 15 years of age, and 51.9% of the 
population consists of people aged 15 to 59 years while those above 60 years of age 
comprise only 4.6% of the total population. Since almost 85% of the population lives in 
the rural part of the country and depends on agriculture, in order to ensure national 
development, it is necessary to maintain & improve the health status of the rural 
population. 
 
Coming to the health situation, the country’s health service coverage is very low and 
there is a high incidence of communicable diseases causing high levels of morbidity and 
mortality in the community. Moreover, increasing prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the 
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community is also aggravating the health problems experienced and number of 
HIV/AIDS patients is growing at an alarming rate, making the country among the few 
African countries with a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. The HIV prevalence rate was 
estimated at 4.4% of the adult population in 2003. It is also estimated that 1.5 million 
people are living with HIV/AIDS. 
 
Due to lack of safe water supply and environmental health services and inadequate health 
education, preventable diseases are very common in the community, causing huge health 
problems. Based on the MOH 2003/04 health data, the national immunization (DPT3) 
coverage is 60.78%; delivery service coverage, 9.45%; contraceptive prevalence rate, 
22.99%; average life expectancy, 54 years; infant mortality rate, 96.8 per 1000 live 
births;  mortality rate for children under 5 is 140.1 per 1000 live births; maternal 
mortality rate is 871 per 100,000 women of childbearing age, and the prevalence of 
maternal malnutrition accounts for 10-23%.                                                                              
 
Some health indicators revealed that Ethiopia has a poor health status compared to other 
sub-Saharan countries.  For instance, the number of children who die before celebrating 
their first birthday (out of 1000 live births) is 66 in Kenya, 88 in Uganda, 95 in Zambia, 
65 in Zimbabwe, 105 in Tanzania and 85 in Madagascar, whereas 96.8 children die in 
Ethiopia. Regarding population access to safe water, it’s 45% in Kenya, 50% in Uganda, 
64% in Zambia, 85% in Zimbabwe and 54% in Tanzania whereas  it is 24% in Ethiopia. 
In order to solve such complex health problems, the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia has formulated a prevention-oriented national health policy and health sector 
strategy. 
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3.4.2 SNNPRS Health Profile 
The SNNPRS recently gave priority to enhance the implementation of community-based 
preventive and rehabilitative health care services, with a focus on primary health care 
service expansion, particularly the health centers with the special health posts. However, 
it is possible to argue that there has not been a corresponding level of service utilization 
by the communities of the SNNPRS. 
 
According to one report from the SNNPRS, at all levels, priority has not been given for 
community-based preventive services that enhance communities' concern for their own 
health. Health education has not been community-centered either which resulted in low 
community awareness and unsatisfactory behavioral change. The fact that health facilities 
didn’t endeavor to create discussion forums between professionals and the community to 
solve health problems jointly is also another major factor for low health coverage. In 
addition, lack of supportive supervision, evaluation and health research had a negative 
impact on the quality and efficient delivery of health service. Hence, the community 
could not fully benefit from the sector.   
Different vital indicators bear witness that the health status of the region ranks among the 
lowest in the country. Life expectancy is 48.6 years at birth (CSA, 1994)71. Infant and 
child mortality rate are estimated at 107 and 157 per thousand live births respectively. 
The crude birth rate is estimated to be 42.6 per thousand. The maternal mortality rate of 
the region is estimated to be similar to that of the country at 871/100,000 live births 
(same source). The table below also shows the indicators of the basic health services. 
                                                 
71 Central Statistical  Authority,1994,32 
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Though one can see a positive trend in the basic health indicators below, it is not 
compatible with the increase in population. From 1998 to 2003, the population increased 
by more than 20% while the public health coverage increased only by 2.2 %. Though 
there is an increasing trend in health service utilization, it is much lower than that in other 
regional states where the health service utilization is a minimum of 50%. The following 
table summarizes some of the basic health indicators in the region. 
 
Indicator  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total 
population 
 
 
12132000 12514999 12903020 13293012 13686011 14084988 
Public 
health 
coverage 
(%) 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
45 45 46 47 47.2 
Health 
service 
utilization 
(%) 
 
 
 
 
- - - 21.9 26.8 37.51 
Family 
planning 
(%) 
 
 
 
9.5 11.1 13 14.5 24.71 28.93 
Antenatal 
Coverage 
(%) 
 
 
 
40.7 43 52 42.5 32.15 40.88 
 
 
Table 3.1:  Summary of basic health indicators in SNNPRS. 
                                                    Source: SNNPRS Health Bureau 
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The burden of death (BOD) in the SNNPR, measured by premature death from all causes, 
comes from primarily preventable causes and is dominated by communicable diseases. 
The leading causes of morbidity and mortality in the region are mostly attributable to lack 
of clean drinking water, poor sanitation, and low public awareness of environmental 
health and personal hygiene practices.  
 
From the entire geographic area, about 60-70% of the population is exposed to malaria, 
and health facility reports imply that malaria is one of the major causes of morbidity. The 
main reasons for the high spread of malaria include lack of community-based 
environmental control activities, global warming, and resistance of malaria parasites and 
mosquitoes to drugs and insecticide chemicals72. 
 
According to the same report mentioned above, during 2004, there were 544,892 malaria 
cases seen at outpatient visits, making up about 23 % of the top 20 reasons for hospital 
outpatients visits, and ranking first at the hospital level. Among those who were admitted 
for hospital care, malaria accounts for 15 %. During the same year, the number of 
reported deaths from malaria  were 1, 755, ranking first and representing 55.5% of all 
hospital deaths. 
 
Moreover, HIV and tuberculosis are posing a huge burden. In particular, the high spread 
of HIV is increasing tuberculosis cases in the communities. On average, about 20 000 
tuberculosis cases are registered annually as compared 5 000 to 8 000 cases 8 years ago. 
                                                 
72 SNNPRS, Regional health bureau, paper on health sector development program, June, 2005, Awassa. 
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In the year 2004, tuberculosis ranked second to malaria as a leading cause of morbidity, 
admission and death in hospitals. An estimated more than 35000 AIDS cases with over 
220 000 people living with HIV/AIDS makes the problem worse with the highest level of 
infection in the age group between 15-24 years. 
 
The existing health infrastructure in the region is low in number and unevenly distributed 
among zones, districts, and urban and rural areas. The ratio of population per health 
institution also shows significant variations. As  can be seen from the report of the RHB 
of the SNNPS, currently there are a total of 15 hospitals, 154 health centers, 210 growing 
health stations and 690 health posts in the SNNPRS. There are also 15 pharmacies, 41 
drug stores and 417 rural drug vendors. Current facility to population ratios are far from 
those proposed by the government under the new four-tier structure of health services. It 
is also possible to see from table 3.1 that health professionals are also very few in the 
regional state and for example, in 2002, only 4 391 health professionals were engaged in 
the health sector. Of these health professionals, 112 were physicians (all types), 2 370 
nurses (all types), 225 sanitarians (all types), 159 pharmacy technicians, 814 health 
assistants, 6 pharmacists, 155 health officers, 355 lab technicians, 20 X-ray technicians 
and 747 female health extension agents. One can see that the ratio of health professionals 
to population is: 1:6,114 for nurses (all type) and 1:129,372 for physicians (all types). If 
we compare this ratio with the international standards, it deviates from the international 
standard of one physician to 10,000 people and one nurse to 5 000 people. 
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It is possible to see the number of health facilities from the following table and, according 
to the table, there is a decreasing trend concerning the number of private clinics and also 
pharmacies. The number of health centers is increasing while that of hospitals shows  
very small progress. The number of health stations shows a decreasing trend and the 
same is true for the number of drug shops. For further details concerning the number of 
health facilities and their trend of expansion in the region, refer to the following table. 
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Hospitals 9 12 12 13 14 15 
Health 
centers 
83 95 107 114 114 127 
Health 
stations 
366 366 350 357 347 347 
Health 
posts 
247 210 290 294 310 450 
Private 
clinics 
143 200 249 195 144 154 
Pharmacies 26 31 27 23 34 24 
Drug shops 42 43 43 39 48 41 
Rural drug 
vendors 
470 478 480 473 473 417 
                                                 
 Table 3.2: The trend in the Number of Health facilities in the SNNPRS 
                       Source: SNNPRS, Regional health bureau, paper on health sector                               
. 
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When we look at the number of health professionals in the region they are not only few in 
number, but also they face unfair assignments, training, transfer and termination and this 
has been affecting the initiative for the efficient provision of  health services73. The 
government has been trying to alleviate the shortage of professionals by building 
institutions for health professionals; however, the output is far from satisfactory.  In some 
Woredas, there are no medical doctors at all while in others there are some but only in 
either NGO or private hospitals. The number of doctors in public hospitals is even lower 
and even the already few are not as such motivated to work. The main reason given as  
justification for such a situation by the government is the departure of health 
professionals to private health facilities where the employment benefits are attractive.   
 
The following table shows the human resources in service in the SNNPRS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 SNNPRS, Regional health bureau, paper on health sector development program, June, 2005, Awassa 
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Human 
resource 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
Physicians 215 180 161 164 177 123  
Health 
Officers 
30 40 52 80 113 145  
Nurses all type 792 957 1140 1302 1655 2034  
Health 
assistance 
1447 1430 1308 1147 988 814  
Pharmacist 10 12 11 18 18 13  
Biologist 6 6 7 14 13 9  
Lab. 
Technician 
104 153 212 258 306 335  
X ray 
technician 
23 24 24 26 24 22  
Sanitarian 133 157 171 183 200 225  
 
Table 3.3: The Trend of Human Resources during the six years in the SNNPRS  
                             Source: SNNPRS,         Regional   health bureau, paper on health sector 
  
As  can abundantly be  seen from the above table, the number of physicians decreased at 
an alarming rate and when the number of physicians in 1998 is compared to that of 2003, 
it decreased by around 50% and this mainly, among other things, is because health 
professionals  look for better incentives in  private health institutions. Most of the 
pharmacies are owned by the private sector and, according to the report of the SNNPRS 
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health office, the higher tax levied on the private pharmacies is the reason for the 
negative trend concerning the number of pharmacies. 
 
Though this has helped the privates sector to provide efficient health service, it has, on 
the other hand, affected the quality and efficiency of health services in public health 
facilities. It can be seen from the following table that current health facility to population 
ratios are far from those proposed and planned by the government74.By specialized 
hospitable, it is  meant that those who serve as referrals and such hospitals are well 
equipped both in human resources, drugs and medical equipments. Zone hospitals are just 
hospitals  serving in an average way and when they have a very serious case they might 
refer their case to the specialized hospitals. District hospitals are those with a very limited 
service group, so they are only used by  the district  they are located in and, from the 
table, the number of existing hospitals and the service given to the people is far less than 
the number of planned hospitals and the number of people that were supposed  to be 
covered under them by the government. The table below therefore summarizes the 
difference in the existing health coverage and the proposed health coverage by the 
regional government. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 SNNPRS, Regional health bureau, paper on health sector development program, June, 
2005, Awassa 
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Table 3.4: Current and Proposed Facility to Population ratio 
                                      Source, Regional health bureau, paper   on health sector                                     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility type Current 
number 
People 
Covered 
  Proposed 
Facility type 
People 
covered 
     
Hospitals (all) 15 1:939,000 Specialized 
hospital 
1:500,000 
-Zonal 6 1:2.4million Zonal hospital 1:1,000,000 
-District 9 1:1.6million District hospital  1:250:000 
Health centers 154 1:94,088  1:25,000 
Health posts 690 1:20,999  1:5,000 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: Discussion of Empirical Findings - Part One 
 
The main objective of this Chapter is to analyze one of the important variables in testing 
the hypothesis against the findings of the research and hence this Chapter is dedicated to 
analyzing intergovernmental transfers. In the first part of the Chapter, the nature of the 
administration and the principles of fiscal decentralization are reviewed in brief and this 
is followed by the second part that is a detailed discussion of intergovernmental transfers 
in Ethiopia and examines how such transfers, especially with regard to health finance, are 
related to health service provision by local governments. The third part is a detailed 
analysis of the allocation of expenditure at the federal, regional and district government 
levels, giving more emphasis to that of the woreda expenditure assignment. Therefore, 
the Chapter will cover general information about intergovernmental transfers in Ethiopia, 
how finance is allocated by different administrative units, the power of the different 
administrative units in intergovernmental transfers and how all this affects  health service 
provision by local governments. 
4.1 Principles  governing Fiscal Decentralization in Ethiopia 
The principle of fiscal decentralization emanates both from the federal and regional 
constitution and devolving fiscal decision-making powers to lower tiers of government 
was the main objective. Minimizing fiscal gaps, effective and efficient delivery of 
services and ensuring fiscal autonomy were also among the basic objectives. Therefore 
the specific objectives of the fiscal decentralization in Ethiopia include enabling regional 
and district governments/administrations to provide standard services in accordance with 
their functional assignments; narrowing the horizontal fiscal gap and ensuring horizontal 
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equalization; promoting efficiency in the allocation of financial resources and, last but 
not  least, maintaining consistency between macroeconomic stability and fiscal 
decentralization.  One of the important instruments to achieve this is intergovernmental 
transfers and, in Ethiopia, the fiscal decentralization strategy has been designed to 
articulate the existing transfer mechanism in a very holistic manner across the different 
tiers of government. One of the principles is therefore making transparent the overall 
calibration of the fiscal administrations and other stoke holders, and indicates current 
development and future direction of the fiscal decentralization landscape. 
4.2. Intergovernmental Transfers in Ethiopia 
As in most federal systems, the aggregate revenue-raising capacity and the aggregate 
expenditure obligation do not correspon in Ethiopia as well. In addition to this, the extent 
of incompatibility of aggregate expenditure requirements and revenue-raising capacity 
among the same level of government is not the same. The introduction of inter-
governmental fiscal transfers is one of the methods to reduce these vertical and horizontal 
imbalances and hence this part of the thesis, as mentioned above, analyzes the 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer system in Ethiopia in general and that of SNNPRS in 
particular75. 
 
The type of intergovernmental transfer from the federal government to that of the 
regional states involves revenue-sharing, general purpose grant, and specific purpose 
grant. Revenue-sharing arrangements are placed together with assignments of tax 
responsibilities and the federal constitution, under article 98, states that the following 
taxes: profit, excise and personal income taxes, on enterprise jointly established by the 
                                                 
75 Ministry of finance, public expenditure program preparation manual 
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federal government and regional states; profits of companies and on dividends due to 
shareholders; and on income derived from large-scale mining and all petroleum and gas 
operations as well as royalties on such operations  are jointly levied and collected. It is 
the House of Federation which determines the division of revenue  between the federal 
and the regional states76. 
 
Revenue-sharing is therefore one of the constituencies of intergovernmental transfers 
applied to relax the powers of sub-national governments to provide services with 
determined shared revenues. It should be noted that revenues collected by sub-national 
governments on the taxes assigned and also on shared revenue are not absorbed by the 
grant system (i.e. the revenues are additional to the grant provided). 
 
As far as the general purpose grant is concerned, the government identified 
decentralization as a precondition for democratization and economic development and 
poverty reduction. The constitution therefore creates federal state structures that devolve 
responsibilities and resources. In the fiscal aspect, this has been explained by the 
introduction of a general purpose grant initially from the federal government to the 
regional states, and later on from the regional government states to the districts. 
In addition to correcting the vertical and horizontal imbalances, the general purpose grant 
to the sub-national level of government will help to create financial capacity for the 
provision of minimum standard of government or public services. The federal grant to 
regions is a very important element in the structure of public finance in Ethiopia and this 
                                                 
76 Ministry of finance, public expenditure program preparation manual 
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 accounts for not less than 75-80% of the government’s expenditure. A grant to a region 
is allocated by using a formula which is designed by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development and approved by the House of Federation. A formulaic approach 
in allocating transfers or grants to regional governments was  first attempted  in Ethiopia 
in 2001/02. However, there are attempts to improve the methodology of determining the 
size and character of the transfer based on countries’ experience and constructive 
comments by  from different stakeholders77. 
 
Accordingly, a new approach was introduced and proposed concerning the federal-
regional general-purpose formula, and the new principle is based on horizontal fiscal 
equalization, which indicates that each regional government should be given the capacity 
to provide the average or standard of public services assuming it operates at an average 
level of efficiency, and make all the effort or average effort to raise revenue from its own 
sources. It takes into account those factors which determine existing disparities in 
expenditure needs and in the revenue capacity of regional governments. The 
determination of expenditure needs is made distinctly for each of the main categories of 
regional expenditure through expenditure assessments. However revenue capacity is also 
determined distinctly for each of the main regional tax instruments by the revenue-base 
assessment method. 
  
The grant from the regions to districts is also allocated using formulas which are more or 
less similar to the federal-regional transfer type and the following part will analyze this in 
detail. 
                                                 
77  Ministry of finance and Economic development, 2002 
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Article 52(2) of the Federal constitution of Ethiopia78 and Article 47(H) of the 
constitution of SNNPRS79 states that consistent with sub-article 1 of this article, States 
shall have the following powers and functions:  
 “To establish a State administration that best advances self-government, a democratic 
order based on the rule of law; to protect and defend the federal constitution; To enact 
and execute the state constitution and other laws; To formulate and execute economic, 
social and development policies, strategies and plans of the State; To administer land 
and other natural resources in accordance with Federal laws; To levy and collect taxes 
and duties on revenue sources reserved to the States and to draw up and administer  the 
State budget”. 
 
This same Article under sub-Art 2 states that regional states shall have the powers “To 
enact and enforce laws on the State civil service and their condition of work; in the 
implementation of this responsibility it shall ensure that educational; training and 
experience requirements for any job title or position approximate national standards; To 
establish and administer a state police force, and to maintain public order and peace 
within the State”.  
The SNNPRS therefore prepares draft proclamations every year and approves the budget 
for each fiscal year. The regional government therefore approves the budget appropriated 
to the Regional, Sub regional (zone) and Woreda public bodies. As far as the budget 
administration is concerned, the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development is 
                                                 
78 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, adopted sep,2000 
79 The Revised Constitution ,2001 of the Southern Nations Nationalities, and Peoples Regional State 
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authorised and directed to distribute the regional government revenue and other funds for 
undertaking by their respective organs. The Bureau of Finance and Economic 
Development has the authority to delegate the power of budget transfer to other public 
bodies including zones, special woredas80 and woredas.  
 
The SNNPRS public financial sources therefore include treasury funding, loans, 
assistance and retained money .However 80% of the finance of the region is covered by 
federal treasury transfer, while the rest 15%, 0.4% and 4.6% are being covered by 
regional tax and non-tax revenue, retained money and loan assistance respectively. 
4.3 Allocation of Expenditure between the Different Administrative Levels 
 
The cabinet at the federal level oversees the implementation of the fiscal decentralization 
strategy of Ethiopia and hence the strategy is primarily executed by the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development and hence this organ is responsible for designing 
the different intergovernmental transfers to regional states.  
 
The regional government  office of economic finance and development is in charge of 
this responsibility while the municipality and the finance office are responsible at the 
district level. At every tier,and  regional government woreda and kebele81 levels, there are 
elected councils, administrators, deputy administrators, spokespersons, deputy 
spokesperson, 3-5 standing committees and cabinets composed of 7-9 members. The 
district administration and spokesperson report to the regional government. 
                                                 
80 Special woredas are woredas who have more power than woredas because they represent one ethnic group who do 
not have zonal administrative structure. 
81 Kebele is an administrative unit at the grass root level and hence under woreda administration. 
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The financial resources of the regional state are allocated to the different administrative 
level(Region, zone, woreda and towns) and functions (contingency and region-wide 
programs) based on the expenditure assignment of each administrative levels. Finally, the 
money allotted to each administrative level is distributed to each individual woreda and 
town on a formula base. Hence, from the total sums, the fund for contingency and 
regional programs is deducted initially and then the rest will be allocated to the different 
levels. The actual budget allocation is the task of each administration and public body at 
each local government level. 
 
In order  to best understand the allocation of the district financial resources in the 
SNNPRS, the nature of district or woreda administration and their power first needs to be 
examined. 
Article 90 of the SNNPRS states that the woreda administration is next to zonal 
administration hierarchies and consists of woreda council, the woreda administrative 
council and the woreda court82.Article 91 of the same constitution states that “ the woreda 
administration shall have all powers necessary to prepare, determine and implement 
within its own administrative region, plans of social services and economic development 
and to enforce laws, policies and directives issued by the regional state“. It is also stated 
that “without the prejudice to the powers and rights to develop its own region and 
determine its own internal affairs, it shall be a subordinate to the regional state and zone”. 
[check quote] Members of the woreda council are directly elected by the people residing 
in the woreda and hence they are accountable to the people who elected them. Article 93 
                                                 
82 The revised Constitution, 2001 of the SNNPRS. 
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of the same constitution further specified the powers and function of the woreda council 
and hence the woreda council is the highest authority of the woreda and is accountable to 
the people of the woreda. The woreda council’s powers and functions include approving 
social services, economic development, administrative plans, programs and budget of the 
woreda;  approving the members of the woreda administrative council up on 
recommendation by the chief administrator; issue its own rules of procedures and ensure 
the timely collection of land tax, agricultural income tax, agricultural products sales tax 
and other taxes and payments. The woreda council can also call and question the chief 
administrator and other officials and investigate their responsibilities. 
 
According to Art 97 and 98 of the SNNPRS constitution, the woreda administrative 
council is the highest executive organ of the woreda and is responsible to the chief 
administrator and woreda council. Among other things, the powers and functions of the 
woreda administrative council include implementing laws, regulations, policies, 
directives, plans, and programs issued by state and federal government; coordinating the 
executive organ of the woreda; following up and supervisin  their activities; preparing the 
woreda’s annual budget; submitting it the woreda council and implementing the same  on 
approval, and preparing socioeconomic and administrative plans and submitting it to the 
woreda council for approval. 
4.3.1 Allocation of the district or Woreda Financial Resources 
Let us analyze how the woreda financial resources are distributed by taking the planned 
budget of the SNNPRS for three years. The proposed budget of woredas in SNNPRS for 
2005/6, 2006/7 and 2007/8 were Birr 960, 1061 and 1175 million respectively. Here the 
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source of finance is 79.3%, 18.5% and 2.2 % from regional treasury transfer, woreda 
revenue, and loan and assistance respectively. In allocating the financial resources to 
individual woredas in the form of block grants, the regional government since 2003/4 
applies “the needs-based output conditional formula”83. Initially 77% of the woreda 
finance is allocated for  recurrent needs and the remaining 23% is allocated for capital 
budget needs and is added together into the block grant. The formula used to calculate the 
woreda block grant is summarized as follows. 
 
BGw = BGr + BGc 
BGr = Salary + Operational Cost 
Salary = Edusal + Healthsal + Agr.sal + Watersal + Roadsal + AGsal 
OpCost = Edopc + Healthopc + Agri.opc + Wateropc + Roadopc + AGopc 
 
BGc = Average of infra deficit and revenue indices* Woreda capital share. 
Where: 
BGw = Block grant woreda 
BGr = Block grant recurrent 
BGc = Block grant capital 
OpCost = Operational cost 
Edopc = Education operational cost, e.t.c. 
                                                 
83 SNNPRS Finance and Economic Development Coordination Bureau, June, 2005, Awassa. 
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It should be noted that both salary and operational costs of each sector are calculated by 
multiplying unit costs of beneficiaries in the sector programs by the target beneficiaries84. 
The sector budget allocation is done by the woredas themselves during block grant 
allocation. However, the sector financial need is calculated and it is the basic element of 
the formula. Accordingly, the sector share from the recurrent budget is shown in the 
following table. 
Table 4:1 Sector budget share from the recurrent resource in % 
                Source: SNNPRS Finance and Economy Development Coordination bureau 
 
 
Sector 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 
Education 44 49 49.7 51 
Health 10.8 12 12 12 
Agriculture 15.6 17 17 18 
Water 1 0.6 0.5 0.5 
Road 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Adam and G.S 28.5 20.5 20 17.5 
Total 100.0 100 100 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 SNNPRS Finance and Economy Development Coordination bureau, paper on medium-term fiscal framework, 2005, 
June, Awassa. 
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The SNNPRS allocates  health finance  based on the following formula: 
 BGw = BGr + BGc 
BGr = BGe + BGh + BGw +BGr +BGa + BGag  
BGc is calculated based on the relative infrastructure deficit index of the five sectors and 
revenue collection index where: 
BGw = Block Grant Woreda 
BGr = Recurrent component of the Woreda Block Grant. 
BGc = Capital component of the Woreda Block Grant. 
BGe = Education component of the recurrent Block Grant. 
BGh = Health component of the recurrent Block Grant. 
BGw = Water component of the recurrent Block Grant. 
BGr = Road component of the recurrent Block Grant. 
BGa = Agriculture component of the recurrent Block Grant. 
BGag = Administrative and general service component of the recurrent Block Grant. 
 
BGh = UC* Beneficiaries 
Beneficiaries = all new visitors of health institutions 
UC = AvHWSal/BHWR + Standard operational cost per beneficiaries where: 
BGh = Health component of the recurrent Block Grant 
UC= unit cost 
AvHWSal = Average health workers salary = total health worker salary/total health 
workers 
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BHWR= Beneficiaries health workers ratio = Beneficiaries/Total health workers 
Standard operational cost per beneficiaries = Standard cost for existing 
institutions/theoretical coverage 
Theoretical coverage: 
                    Health Center =25,000 population 
                    Clinic = 10,000 population 
                    Health Post= 5000 population 
Standard cost for existing institutions: 
                    Health Center = Birr85115, 200.00 
                     Clinic = Birr 23,600.00 
                     Health Post = 8,200 
 
Though each health office, at it administrative level, plans its health sector expenses, 
together with the finance office in each level, the above report from the SNNPRS finance 
and economic office86 indicates that the share of the health sector to the different districts 
or woreda is determined by considering the number of health service beneficiaries as the 
major cost driver. The formula does not consider other factors in the allocation of  health 
finance and many people in the district argue that the allocation of  health finance is not 
fair.  
 
 
 
                                                 
85 Birr is the Ethiopian paper money and 1 Birr = 0.1 Euro. 
86 SNNPRS  Council,2004,unpublished material  
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CHAPTER 5: Discussions of empirical findings - Part Two 
 
This chapter is the continuation of the previous chapter and hence presents the main and 
major findings of the Thesis during the field research in Ethiopia. This chapter therefore 
has three parts. The first part deals with the different findings at the federal level and 
hence mainly concentrates on the Federal Ministry of Health and Federal Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development. The next part of the paper addresses the findings at 
the regional level and hence it is devoted to analyzing the findings from the SNNPRS 
Health Bureaus, the Region’s Finance and Economic Development Bureaus and the 
Council of the Regional Government People’s Representatives. The last part of the paper 
deals with the findings at the District level and hence covers the Cheha District Health 
Office; the Woreda’s Finance Office and the Woreda’s Council. The view of other 
stakeholders such as nongovernmental organization operating in the District is also 
considered here. 
5.1. The Federal Ministry of Health 
Over the last decade, the government of Ethiopia has initiated a comprehensive economic 
reform program which has had an important bearing on the development of the key 
socioeconomic sectors including health. The Federal Ministry of Health has taken 
important steps in the decentralization of the health system and, as a result, the decision-
making process in the development and implementation of the health system is shared 
between the Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH) the Regional Health Bureaus (RHBs) 
and the Woreda Health Offices (WHOs). The FMOH, after health service 
decentralization, concentrates only on policy maters and technical support. 
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The FMOH, in 2000, took two crucial measures and these are the development of the 
introduction of a new national health policy and subsequently the formulation of a 
comprehensive health sector development program (HSDP). Both of the reform measures 
undertaken are said to be the result of the critical assessment and analysis of the nature 
and causes of the country’s health problem.  
 
The Ministry of Health has specific focuses as far as the decentralization of health in 
Ethiopia was concerned, and it is argued that during the health system decentralization, 
the Ministry of Health strongly focused on democratization and decentralization of the 
health service system and hence there was an effort to democratize the health system87. 
The ministry worked hard in the implementation and establishment of health councils 
with strong community representation at all levels and health committees at grass root 
levels to participate in identifying major health problems, budgeting, planning, and 
implementation, monitoring and evaluating health activities88. 
 
 It is also argued that the health system decentralization in Ethiopia is realized through 
the transfer of the major parts of decision-making, health care organization, capacity-
building, planning, implementation and monitoring to the regions with a clear definition 
of roles89. It is further noted that, as a result of the decentralization of the health system in 
Ethiopia, the Ministry of Health is able to establish a health sector development 
programme which is based on the sector-wide approach (Swap). The ministry has a long-
term strategic framework built on the partnership of the Federal Government, the health 
                                                 
87 Ahmed, Sept 11, 2005. 
88 Ahmed, Sep11, 2005. 
89 Gedissa, Sep13, 2005. 
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sector donors and NGOs and the private sector in the planning, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of the program. Concerning the problems the health sector of 
the country has, it is argued that shortage and quality of skilled human resource at all 
levels and financial constraints for capital investment and to meet recurrent costs are the 
major ones90. 
 
Theoretically speaking, it is said that decentralization in the health sector can be 
discussed as a process which involves a variety of mechanisms to transfer fiscal and 
administrative ownership and /or political authority for health service delivery from the 
Central Ministry of Health (MOH) to alternate institutions. The main objectives are also 
efficiency, quality and equity and these were also the objectives of the FMOH in Ethiopia 
too. As far as the decentralization of the health system in Ethiopia is concerned, the 
Ministry of Health, as a principal, has transferred huge duties and responsibilities to the 
agents which are the Regional Health Bureaus and Woreda Health Offices91. The Federal 
Ministry of Health (FMOH), as a principal, is responsible for the formulation of health 
sector policies, plans and health care standards, provision of technical assistance, 
logistical support and advice to RHBs. The Ministry Office as a principal is also 
responsible for the promotion of expansion of equitable health service throughout the 
country, conducting and coordinating monitoring and evaluation activities, coordination 
of foreign assistance and other resources for the health sector and, in collaboration with 
appropriate institutions, the development of policy guidelines and standards for the 
training of health workers. 
                                                 
90 Gedissa, Sep 11, 2005. 
91 FDRE, Ministry of Health, 2005. 
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The Principal, the FMOH, has interests in the agents and this is the efficient provision 
and promotion of the expansion of equitable health services throughout the country and, 
for that reason, it transferred many responsibilities so that the ministry would realize the 
national health objectives of the country. The Ministry, as a principal, has controlling 
mechanisms through which it will make sure that the agents, the RHB and the WHO, are 
implementing the national health policy of the country. This includes monitoring and 
evaluation, supervision and follow-ups of the activities of the RHB and that of the WHO. 
Though the agents have an agreement to implement the interests of the principal, they 
have their own interests too. In the SNNPRS RHB, for example, there are areas of 
priorities that the Bureau wants to address first which might not be the interest of the 
principal. There are region-based diseases, for example, which are the interest of the 
agents and this might not be of interest to the principal, who has a national health policy. 
5.2 The Federal Ministry of Finance. 
The other important principal in the health system decentralization is the Federal Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development which is responsible for the fiscal 
decentralization taking place in the country. The fiscal decentralization has a direct 
impact on the health system decentralization, as the health finance allocation is changed 
by the fiscal decentralization92. The main responsibility of the Finance and Economic 
Development Ministry of Ethiopia in the decentralization of the revenue-expenditure was 
implementing sound fiscal decentralizations and hence to devolve fiscal decision-making 
power to lower tiers of government such as the Regional and Woreda Governments. The 
other specific objectives of the ministry were to enable Regional and Woreda 
Governments/Administrations to provide standard activities in accordance to functional 
                                                 
92 Tizta, ministry of Finance, Sep2005. 
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assignments; to narrow the horizontal fiscal gap and ensure horizontal equalization; to 
promote efficiency in the allocation of financial resources, and to maintain consistency 
between macroeconomic stability and fiscal decentralization93. 
 
Concerning the grant system, the Federal Government applies, it is argued, that the 
general purpose grant provides discretion on the use of financial resources by the regional 
government and subsequently to the Woredas94. Therefore, encouraging local decision-
making is the main value of the Ministry office. It is also said that the transfer formula 
addresses both efficiency and equity during the allocation of resources to regions and also 
considers policies, the available resources and expenditure needs at macro level. 
According to the focus group discussion with staff of the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development (MOFED), the Ministry designs the intergovernmental transfer 
formula but it needs to be approved by the House of Federation with the aggregate level 
and its distribution needs to be approved by Cabinet and Parliament95. The formula is 
calculated by taking in to account population, level of development, expenditure needs or 
development level variables and fiscal effort as well as performance measurement in key 
sectors with weights assigned to the main indicators. The formula, the ministry applies 
therefore may change from year to year based on needs to adjust it. It is very difficult to 
understand how the level of development was used to grant finance and, sometimes under 
the cover of this variable, there are regions that got inequitable grants compared to others 
                                                 
93 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, policy paper, 2004. 
94 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, policy paper, 2004. 
95 Focus group discussion, Sep13, 2005. 
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and hence the variable lacks sound definition96. However it should be noted that 
population, poverty, level of development/expenditure needs and revenue- raising effort 
and sectoral output performance are the main indicators. 
 
The transfer mechanism definitely affects the provision of services such as health by 
local governments. This is because the Ministry of Finance takes into account the number 
of beneficiaries in the health sector, for example, when they calculate the need for 
expenditure. 
5.3 SNNPRS Health Bureau 
 
The SNNPRS Health Bureau is a very important actor in the decentralization of the 
health system in the SNNPRS and hence it is an agent for the FMOH. As an agent, it has 
a contract with the Ministry of Health and hence is responsible for implementing the 
national health policy at the regional level. The type of relationship the regional health 
bureau has with the FMOH is based on mutual interest and the RHB has the power to 
independently formulate regional health care plans and programs based on national health 
policies and health development programs. The establishment and management of the 
health facilities (health centers, health posts) and training institutions, and recruitment, 
training and administration of mid-level health professionals including health extension 
workers, are also the responsibility of the RHB. The procurement and distribution of 
drugs, equipment and other medical supplies; invitations for bids, evaluating contract 
awarding, and supervision of construction of health facilities (HPs and HCs); monitoring 
                                                 
96 Getachew, head of the finance office of the SNNPRS health office, Sep16, 2005(Getachew further noted that as the 
intergovernmental transfer indicators such as population are vague the regional government is in the process of 
changing the criteria for the intergovernmental transfers). 
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and evaluation of the implementation of health programs and writing  progress reports on 
the implementation of the FMOH are also the major responsibilities of the RHB97.  
 
It is argued that the community of the SNNPRS seems not to accept the regional health 
policy which gives emphasis to protection against diseases98. Zeleke argues that the 
regional state was somewhat forgotten during the previous military government’s rule 
and hence the region’s health coverage, taking into account the criteria of the World 
Health Organization, is only 50%. According to the World Health Organization, an area 
is said to be covered under health services if the community can access health institutions 
such as hospitals within two Kilometers. It is also noted that  health service provision by 
the SNNPRS Health Office is only urban area-based and hence this is a very great 
obstacle to providing health services for the rural people who comprise more than 80% of 
the total population of the region. As far as the major problem of providing health 
services in the region is concerned, it is noted that lack of health professionals and health 
finance is the major ones99. 
 
It was further noted that though power is devolved up to the District level, lack of 
resources such as skilled manpower and capital challenged the efficient provision of 
health service. Asked about the mechanism which the regional government uses to follow 
up the activities of the Woreda level health offices, the head of the SNNPRS Health 
Office noted that a meeting is held every six months with the District Health Offices in 
order to discuss problems related to health service provision. He also said that there are 
                                                 
97 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Health, 2005. 
98 Zeleke,SNNPRS,Sep15,2005 
99 Zeleke, SNNPRS; Sep15, 2005. 
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efforts to organize different workshops and conferences in order to share experiences 
with different District Governments. 
 
The Regional State which is very wide100 has little contact with the Cheha District and 
there are no appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms which the RHB as a 
principal uses to make sure that the Woreda Health Office that is the agent is acting 
according to the Regional health policy. There is a very wide gap as concerns the relation 
of the RHB with that of the WHO, and this is creating a problem with regard to 
information-sharing. Asked about the way the Cheha District Health Office is operating 
with the District Council, the head of the Regional Health Bureau said that he has no 
information at all. It must be noted that in the Cheha District Council Cabinet, the Health 
Office of the District is not represented and hence this, according to the District Health 
Office, has a negative impact. 
5.4 The SNNPRS Finance Office 
 
The SNNPRS Finance Office is the other important institution in the decentralization of 
the health system in the SNNPRS. This is because it is the Finance Office which decides 
on the distribution of the block grants which go to the different Districts including the 
Cheha District. The Finance and Economic Development Office of the SNNPRS has a 
tremendous responsibility in allocating the block grant which is transferred to the Woreda 
Districts and hence this part will focus on an in-depth analysis of how the Regional 
intergovernmental transfer is allocated by the office.  
 
                                                 
100 SNNPRS is a unification of four previous regional states that are squeezed into one by the federal government for 
the sake of administration, and has more than 114 districts. 
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It is argued that, in the SNNPRS, the decentralization of the health system was introduced 
in 2002 when the region was devolving all powers to the District Governments and hence 
the financial responsibility was also devolved to the Woreda Finance Office101. The 
Region’s Finance Office allocates the block grant to the Woreda Finance Office and it is 
the responsibility of the Woreda Finance Office to allocate the money to the different 
sector offices of the District. It is further noted that though revenue and expenditure 
power was devolved to District Governments, the decentralization took place in a region 
that is suffering from a lack of adequate human resource at the District level. In the 
mechanisms by which the block grant is transferred from the Regional Government to the 
District Government, population, revenue-raising ability of District Governments and the 
level of backwardness102 are the main criteria in determining the amount of the block 
grant. It is said that the idea of decentralization is always good and an intergovernmental 
transfer is a very good instrument to address the problems related to revenue-raising 
power by local government. However, in the SNNPRS, before implementing the 
devolution type of decentralization, the Districts need to be capacitated first both in 
revenue expenditure responsibility and in terms of human resources, and hence, the 
decentralization that took place in the SNNPRS is ambitious103. 
 
The other crucial institution in the decentralization of the health system is the Woreda 
Health Office, and both the FMOH and the SNNPRS HBS are the principal while the 
Woreda Health Office is the agent. The Cheha Woreda Health Office (WHO), as an 
                                                 
101 Getachew, head of the finance office of the SNNPRS health office, Sep16, 2005 
102 Level of backwardness is measured in terms of access to socio economic services such as infrastructure, health 
service coverage and education. 
103 Getachew, head of the finance office of the SNNPRS health office, Sep16, 2005 
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agent, needs to work on the basis of the rules and regulations of the two principals. The 
responsibility of the WHO therefore includes District level health planning, resource 
allocation implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Implementation of health 
programs include the construction of health facilities, management of District health 
facilities (District hospitals, HCs and HPs), including human resources, and the selection 
of sites for the construction of health facilities including the supervision of construction 
are the activities performed by the agent and hence the following part of the thesis 
analysizes the institutions affecting health service delivery. Therefore, the SNNPRS 
health office focuses only on policy issues and hence the health service provision 
responsibilities are devolved to District Governments though they face many obstacles to 
implement them. 
5.5 The Cheha District 
At the District level, there are three important actors which affect the efficient and 
effective allocation of health services to the community and these are discussed below. 
5.5.1 The Cheha District Health Office 
The Cheha District Health Office is located in the District’s main town called Emdibir 
and the main task of the office is to provide health services by combining the resources 
from all interested stakeholders such as NGOs working in the District, other neighboring 
District Health Offices and in the community of the District. Therefore, improving the 
health conditions of the community is the central objective of the District Health Office.  
The Woreda Health Office is responsible for District level health planning, resource 
allocation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. It is also responsible for 
implementation of health programs including the construction of health facilities, and the 
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management of District health facilities such as District hospitals, health centers and 
health posts104. The selection of sites for the construction of health facilities including the 
supervision of construction is also the mandate of the District Health Office.  
 
Although the District Health Office has such goals, the realities on the ground and the 
observation of the researcher are that the District Health Office has so many challenges 
and obstacles that hinder it from achieving its goals105. The figure about the number of 
health institutions is a bit shocking and hence there is only one hospital, two health 
centers, three clinics and 6 health posts which provide health services for about around 
200,000 people106. There is no public hospital at all, and hence even the hospital and the 
two health centers are owned by nongovernmental organizations, and this shows the lack 
of concern from the government’s side with regard to the health services in the District 
and, due to this, the primary health care coverage is only 49.4%107. 
 
According to the report of the Cheha District Health Office108, there are 57 health 
professionals working in the government-owned health centers while there are also 
around 57 health professionals in nongovernmental organizations operating in the area. 
Among the 57 health professionals working in the District, only four of them work in the 
District’s Health Office in the area of management while the rest are assigned to different 
health institutions operating in the District. Of these four health professionals serving the 
                                                 
104 Health centres are bigger institutions than health posts. 
105 Eyoel, Sep17, 2005, Emdibir. 
106 Focus group discussion and observation, Sep19, 2005. 
107 Cheha woreda Health office report of the 2004/5 health service activities. 
108 Cheha woreda Health office report of the 2004/5 health service activities. 
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District Health Office, there is no Medical Doctor and hence all are Nurses109. The 
District has a very serious shortage of health professionals and even the four Nurses 
serving the District Health Office are not well trained in the necessary skill to manage the 
District health system. None of the Nurses are trained in management and hence lack the 
appropriate management skill110. 
 
Though there are still many problems related to the provision of the health services by the 
Cheha District Health Office, there is some progress and improvement in the provision of 
health services over recent years111. This can be understood from the table below which 
shows the different health services provided by the District Health Office. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109 Eyoel, Sep17, 2005, Emdibir. 
110 During the focus group discussion, the participants said that they never had training on management-related issues 
and this undermined their actions in managing the activities of the health service in the district. 
111 Focus group discussion, Sep20, Emdibir. 
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Type of 
health 
services. 
 Number of  
Beneficiaries 
in % 2002 
Number of 
Beneficiaries 
in % 2003 
Number of 
Beneficiaries 
in % 2004 
Planned  
Number of 
Beneficiaries 
in % 
2005/2006 
 
      
vaccination 
coverage for 
children,  
 50.8 51.1 57.4 93 
Smallpox  55.3 32.9 55.3 75 
Vaccination 
for pregnant 
women 
 53.3 25.5 62.8 70 
Vaccination 
for non-
pregnant 
women 
 37.5 22.2 35.7 85 
Health 
education 
coverage 
 -- 29.1  90 
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Family 
planning 
coverage 
13.7  24.2  44.3 60 
       
Sanitation 
coverage 
 31.7  40.5 96.3 98 
 
                    Table 5.1: Health service provision by the Cheha district health office                              
Source: Cheha district health office. 
 
 
From the above table, it is possible to see that the number of beneficiaries of the health 
service increases from time to time. For example, the smallpox vaccination coverage 
increased by 6.6 % from the years 2002 to 2004, and vaccination for non-pregnant women 
also shows an increase of 9.5 percent. We can see a very dramatic change with regard to 
the health education coverage and, according to the panelists, there was no health education 
for the community during the year 2002 and 2003 but, in 2004, the Woreda Health Office 
provided health education for 29% of the community and this was mainly because of the 
spread of HIV-AIDS at an alarming rate. The District Health Office also planned to provide 
health services for 90% of the community by 2005/6.  
 
The District Health Office has also been able to realize a increase in family planning as the 
number of people who are using family planning increased by 30.6% when we compare the 
figures for the year 2002 with that of 2004. However, the panelists told the researcher that 
most of the health centers, including the hospitals, are owned by the Catholic Church and 
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this had an adverse effect on the introduction of family planning as the Church believes 
only in natural and not man-made methods of family planning. We can see also a very good 
improvement especially in the provision of sanitary services. The panelists told the 
researcher that community awareness about sanitation increased greatly, and they had 
started building communal latrines in collaboration with the local community  and,  by  
2004, 96.3 % of the District’s community had access to sanitation. 
 
Therefore, it is noted that the Cheha District Health Office has committed staff that work 
hard and are doing their best in order to provide effective health services for the 
community112.  
 
It is noted that though there are efforts to provide health services in an efficient way, there 
are still many problems and obstacles facing the Cheha District Health Office113. Therefore, 
it should be understood that the main activities of the Cheha District Health Office include 
organizing and conducting training for the health professionals in the District, monitoring 
and evaluation of the activities of all health institutions in the District and making a follow-
up visit to the different health centers in the District. The District Health Office implements 
the Regional Health Bureau’s health policy and, in doing so, the office gets much support 
from the Zonal114 level Health Office whose responsibility is only coordinating the 
activities of District Health Offices and giving some technical assistance to the District 
Health Office staff. 
 
                                                 
112 Focus group discussion, Sep20, Emdibir 
113 Tamrate, Sep, 20, 2005, Emdibir. 
114 Zone is a local government administrative unit above woreda but its role is only coordination. 
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As far as the outcome of decentralizing the health system is concerned, the Cheha District 
witnessed some progress in the allocation of health services. It is further said that, before 
the health system decentralization took place, it was the Zonal administrative unit which 
implements all the health policy and hence the District Health Office was directly 
accountable for the Zonal Health Office. However, after the health system was 
decentralized to the District level, it was the District Health Office that implemented the 
Regional Health policy, monitored and evaluated the health institutions operating in the 
District and hence exercised more power115. The District Health Office prepares its annual 
plan, proposes the required budget to implement its activities, and also prepares reports on 
activities conducted by the Regional Health Bureaus. 
Sharing the same view, it is argued that the Cheha District Health Office is doing its best to 
make the community a greater participant in the provision of health services116. It is also 
noted that there are two lower hierarchical administrative levels below the Woreda Health 
Office, and these are the Kebele Health Posts and the Village Health Posts which are 
located at the grass root level in the community. This structure of the District Health 
Office, according to the information from the Cheha District Health Office, helped the 
office to access the community very easily and hence was very effective for health service 
delivery. I have asked also if there is a controlling mechanism which the District Health 
Office uses, and the Woreda Health Office made it clear that there are controlling 
mechanisms through which the District Health Office ensures that the lower level 
institutions are performing their activities efficiently and these includes following-up the 
activities of the Kebele and Village Health Posts through monthly meetings, session 
                                                 
115 Tamrate, Sep, 20, 2005, Emdibir. 
116 Argawe 19,2005,Emdibir 
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encompassing all role-players, monitoring and evaluation and supervision. Field visits are 
also another mechanism for following up on their activities. 
 
Asked about the main problems the Cheha Health Office faced, staff of the Office noted 
that the problems of health service delivery in Cheha District are very complex and 
complicated. Some of the problems include lack of skilled manpower, unfair and 
inadequate allocation of health finance, and these are among the major obstacles for health 
service delivery in the District. It is said that the District Health Office has a wide gap as 
far as health professionals are concerned and, currently, only four professionals are serving 
the office, which has 12 vacant posts. Therefore, 75% of health professionals are not 
recruited in the District, and the reason given for this is the lack of adequate finance for the 
health sector and the migration of health professionals from government-owned health 
institutions to the private sector in their search for better incentives. 
 
According to the Cheha District Health Office, health finance allocation is the biggest 
problem in the provision of efficient health services. This is because, according to two staff 
members of the Health Office, it is the District Council117 which has more say about the 
distribution of the District revenue to the different sectors such as education, health and 
agriculture. What is surprising is the fact that the Health Office has no say at all on health 
finance except to propose the necessary amount of money needed for the health service 
activities118. Therefore, the Health Office always gets very little health finance and hence 
                                                 
117 It is the woreda council who decides the budget share of each sector including health, and the district does not have 
a formula on which the share of each sector can be decided. This is not the case at regional level as the regional 
government has some formulas to determine the grant allocated to different districts. 
118 Tamrate, Sep, 20, 2005, Emdibir. 
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the revenue distribution by the District Council is not based on a scientific formula or needs 
assessment and is vague. The district Council is the government institution and most of its 
staff don’t have any education and are basically appointed for political reason only mainly 
for supporting the ruling party. 
 
The District Health Officers therefore noted that their Office is not represented on the 
Cabinet that approves the budget allocated to the different sectors. As a consequence of 
this, the researcher interviewed one of the important institutions influencing health service 
provision and that is the District Finance Office. The researcher studied how the Finance 
Office allocate the revenue of the District to the different sector offices, and this is 
discussed in the next part. 
 
5.5.2 The Cheha District Finance Office. 
According to Art.98(1) of  the revised constitution, 2001 of the SNNPRS, the Woreda 
Administrative Council has the right to prepare the Woreda’s annual budget  , submit it to 
the Woreda’s Council and implement the same  on approval. The Woreda Finance Office is 
the responsible organ for determining the share of the different sector offices of the District 
such as health, and the proposed budget needs to be approved by the Woreda 
Administrative Council which consists of the chief of each sector such as capacity-
building, agriculture etc. As we have seen above, the information from the Cheha District 
Health Office testified that health finance allocation among the different sector offices by 
the Finance Office is not fair, and is unjustly allocated. However, according to the Cheha 
District Finance Office staff, the District Finance Office is doing well, and hence the 
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allocation of District revenue among the different sector offices is fair. The District Health 
Office has rules and regulations whereby revenue is distributed and the Office works hand-
in-hand with the Woreda Council and other sector offices. 
 
The Finance Office is also encouraging the community to be aware the relevance of paying 
taxes so that the revenue-raising power of the District is improved. The community, 
according to the Finance Office of the District, is now well aware of the relevance of 
paying taxes and hence the Office is doing well in this regard. 
 
The chief executive of the District Finance Office further noted that the Finance Office is 
expected to mobilize the revenue for the District and the main tax base for the District is 
the income tax from workers, merchants and the peasants. The District Finance Office 
distributes the revenue for the different sector offices based on the number of beneficiaries 
proposed by each sector office. Most of the budget, which goes to the different sectors, 
comes from the intergovernmental transfers by the Regional Government in the form of 
block grants. Poverty reduction, rural development and education are the priority of the 
Woreda Finance Office. Concerning the mechanisms through which the Finance Office 
determines what money should go to which sector or the criteria used in transferring the 
money to different sector offices, the Finance Office needs to revise and develop it well. 
The Finance Office accepts the budget requisition from each sector office and then 
determines the budget for each year without applying any sound criteria though there are 
some developed by the Regional State Finance Office. The final decision concerning the 
budget is done by the Woreda Council Cabinet. According to Art.97 of the SNNPRS 
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constitution, the Administrative Council or the Cabinet is the highest administrative organ 
of the Woreda. It is responsible to the chief administrator and the Woreda Council. It 
should be noted that the Administrative Council compromises the chief and deputy 
administrators and heads of offices. It must be remembered that according to staff of the 
Woreda Health Office it is being mentioned that there is unfair allocation of health finance, 
but the information from the Finance Office, against the view of the Health Office staff, 
indicates that the Woreda Finance Office has a formula through which it allocates a budget 
and the only problem they had is the inadequate funds allocated to them119.  
 
However, unlike the view of the chief executive of the Finance Office that the Office has a 
good mechanism in determining the allocation of funds to the different sector offices, the 
researcher observed that there are no written and documented rules and regulations or 
formulas which the Woreda Finance Office uses to distribute the budget to different sector 
offices. The Finance Office organizes a meeting and then listens the budget requisition of 
the representative of each sector office, which are members of the Administrative Council. 
Then the budget is allocated based on the argument of each individual who represents the 
different sectors. Unfortunately, the Health and Education sector offices are represented by 
one individual from the education sector in the Administrative Council and, hence, the 
health sector was getting a much smaller budget, unlike the other sector offices which have 
a very limited budget need. 
 
                                                 
119 Zeytuna 24,2005,Emdibir 
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Therefore though in the law of the Regional Government it was stated that the Woreda 
Administrative Council should consist the head of each sector office in the Cheha District, 
the Health Office is not represented at the Council and this has a negative impact on the 
allocation of health finance. 
 
The Woreda Finance Office has also a serious problem with regard to professional 
capacity. Most staff, including the chief executive, are in their positions not because of 
merit but for political reasons or because they are loyal to the ruling party. The member of 
the ruling party controlled all key positions in the office and there is a very serious need for 
professional workers as the finance office seems unable to work in an efficient manner. 
There are very clear symptoms of the possibility of corruption in the office and, for 
example, the chief accountant of the District Finance Office is the husband of the chief 
executive of the Finance Office and such relations may put accountability and 
responsibility in danger. 
The interference of the ruling party in each and every staff complement of the civil service 
in the finance office, the lack of professional staff and lack of responsibility and 
accountability therefore seem to be the main problem in the revenue and expenditure 
allocation responsibility of the District, and this has a very negative impact on the provision 
of social services such as health. The finance Office however noted that the lack of 
willingness of the community to pay taxes is a major problem in the District, and the 
community needs to pay taxes on time. The government should try to recruit professional 
workers and should also try to capacitate the District with human resources and this will 
contribute to the efficient allocation of finance for health services.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
The objective of this last Chapter of the Thesis is to conclude the findings of the Thesis 
and then make some recommendations based on the findings of the Thesis. 
The implementation of health policy at community and household level is crucial to 
ensure rural development and healthy citizens. Key obstacles in the sector that hinder the 
SNNPRS Health Bureau’s vision in general and that of the Cheha District Health Office’s 
vision in particular from being realised were not properly identified previously. There 
was not a lot of research done in the SNNPRS and the Cheha District, and the problems 
related to  health service provision were not pointed out with regard to internal and 
external situations, opportunities and strengths. In addition, problem-solving approaches 
are not yet implemented at the Cheha Woreda Health Office.  
 
However, based on the findings of the paper, it is possible to conclude the following 
points: 
The FMOH has exercised decentralization of the health system in Ethiopia, and hence 
devolved all power and responsibility to the Regional Government’s Health Office, and 
finally to the District level Health Office. The SNNPRS Health Office therefore also 
devolved all power and responsibility to the Cheha District Health Office at the grassroot 
level of the government. The Cheha District Health Office has full rights in terms of 
deciding health issues in the District with the exception of  health finance, and  
interference from higher level government institutions such as the MOH and the 
SNNPRS Health Bureau is very low. It is thus possible to conclude that the decision-
space of local governments in the SNNPRS is very wide. 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
 
The SNNPRS, as discussed in Chapter four, has a vague intergovernmental transfer, 
especially with regard to the indicators of the intergovernmental formula. This is because 
some of the criteria are not well defined and  are vague. For example, backwardness is 
said to be one of the criteria in distributing the block grant among the existing Woredas 
but the term ``backwardness’’ is not well defined, and the politicians simply point out 
one of the Woredas  they belong to as being backward and favor them during the 
allocation of finance. Therefore, the intergovernmental transfer needs to be studied well 
and revised based on scientific methods. 
 
There is a very weak link between the Regional Health Office that is the principal and the 
Cheha District Health Office that is the agent. The SNNPRS Health Bureau does not have 
the instruments to make sure that the agent - the District Health Office -is performing its 
function well. The intergovernmental relation of the region is therefore somewhat weak. 
Weak supportive supervision and feedback from higher levels such as the Regional 
Health Bureau and that of the Zonal Health Office also made  health service delivery 
inefficient. The Regional Health Office needs to strengthen its relations with the Woreda 
Health Offices through different mechanisms such as meetings, workshops and 
supervision.  
 
The Council of the Cheha Woreda District, which is the other important principal, also 
has  very poor relations with the District Health Office. The way the Council assigns the 
budget among different sector offices is very vague and lacks openness and needs to be 
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revised. The Health Office is also not represented in the Cabinet of the District Council 
and this also needs to be assessed, and the health sector should be represented like other 
sector offices in the Cabinet. 
 
The other key obstacles to the provision of the  service include budget shortages for the 
health sector and a lack of professionals in the Health Office, both in the area of health 
and management. The health finance assigned to the Cheha District is not enough and 
hence there is limited access to health services and also a limited utilization of the already 
existing health resources. The quality of the available services is also poor. Weak 
implementation and absorptive capacity at all levels, especially at the grassroot level, and 
weak integration with partners and empowerment of the community in health care 
delivery and co-management of health care system are also the problems of health 
services in the District. The Cheha District Health Office also has poor analysis and 
utilization of decision-making capabilities, and  private health sector expansion is also 
very poor in the District.  
 
Although the above-listed problems are impediments both to the SNNPRS and the Cheha 
District health services, the key problem is the shortage and unfair allocation or 
assignment of health professionals in management posts and the lack of adequate 
response to structural demands  as well as the  recurrent budget deficits with regard to 
health finance.  
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It is the belief of the writer of this Thesis that the following recommendations can be 
made based on the findings of the research, and the recommendations will contribute to 
solving the problems related to  health service delivery in the SNNPRS in general and the 
Cheha District in particular.  
 
The first recommendation is that the role of intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia in 
general and that of SNNPRS in particular need to be well studied and conceptualized. 
The intergovernmental transfer by the SNNPRS needs to be  studied in-depth and revised. 
The criteria for assigning the expenditure budget to each District needs to be  studied 
well. 
  
As health is the primary concern of the SNNPRS, enough health finance should be 
allocated by the Regional Government. The SNNPRS is one of the widest and most 
complex regional states of Ethiopia and hence the Federal Government needs to further 
study the disadvantages and advantages of administering such a very large and complex 
region under one regional state120. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
also needs to thoroughly follow up the activities of the SNNPRS Finance Office. The 
Ministry also needs to work on improving the intergovernmental relations it has with the 
SNNPR Finance Office. 
In addition, the Ministry of Health needs to strengthen its relations with the SNNPRS 
Health Bureau specially with regard to solving the severe health professional shortage in 
                                                 
120 SNNPRS is a unification of four regional states and there is a very strong armed struggle being waged  by some of 
the ethnic groups to have their own regional state. As Ethiopia is following ethnic federalism, it is very difficult to 
govern more than 45 ethnic groups residing in the Southern part under one regional state. The people need to be asked 
whether they want to be administeredas one regional state or not. It was the government which simply squeezed the 
four previous regional states into one regional state. 
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the region. The SNNPRS Finance Office is recommended to strengthen its source of 
finance and also review the intergovernmental formula it uses to allocate the block grant 
to different Woreda Administrations. The SNNPRS Health Office is also expected to 
work hand-in-hand with the Cheha Woreda Health Office, especially with regard to 
training for health professionals who serve in  management positions in the Cheha 
District Health Office. 
 
The Cheha District Council needs to avoid interfering with the activities of the different 
sector offices such as health and needs to respect the power granted by the constitution of 
the country. The Council also needs to represent each sector office in its Cabinet. The 
Cheha District Finance Office also needs to have a very sound and open formula through 
which the District expenditure is allocated to the different sector offices in a justifiable 
way. The District Finance Office also needs to make sure that the budget of the Woreda 
is used for its intended objective, and not for some political agenda of the government 
and, hence, there should be neutrality. The Finance Office also needs to strengthen its 
controlling mechanism with regard to its financial management. 
The Cheha District Health Office also needs to strengthen its relationship with other 
stakeholders, such as the private sector and NGOs and the Ethiopian Catholic Church 
which has so many health-related projects in the District. The District Health Office 
needs to raise its capacity through training and workshops by working with the Regional 
Government Health Office. The District Health Office therefore needs to work on in-
house staff training, especially in the area of monitoring, evaluation and training in the 
fields of administration.  
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List of Interview Partners. 
 
Ahmed Dereje. Staff member Ministry of Health, September 11, 2005, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. 
Argawe, Roba, Coordinator of the Cheha district health offices, Cheha district health 
           Office, Sep 21, 2005, Emdibir. 
Eyoel Tesema. Project officer of the Emdibir Archdiocese of the Catholic Church, Sep,  
           17, Emdibir. 
Fikru Zeleke, Spokesperson of the SNNPRS people representative council, SNNPRS 
Council of the people’s representative, Sep 12, 2005, Awassa, Ethiopia. 
Gedissa J. Data and Information Office Coordinator, Ministry of Health, Sep 13, 2005. 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
Getachew Eshetu, Program Coordinator, Economic and Finance Coordination Office of 
the SNNPRS, Sep15, 2005, Awassa, Ethiopia 
Tamrate, Mola, Chief of the Cheha district health office, Cheha district health office, Sep, 
          20, 2005, Emdibir. 
Tizita Amare, Program Coordinator of regional budget affairs, Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development. Sep 3, 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
 Zeleke Gobe, Head of the SNNPRS Health Bureau, SNNPRS Health Bureau, Sep 15, 
2005, Awassa, Ethiopia 
Zeytuna, Ibrahim, chief executive of the Cheha district finance office, Cheha district  
            finance Office, Sep, 21, 2005, Emdibir. 
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Focus Group discussion concerning fiscal decentralization in Ethiopia: Six individuals 
participated and these are staff members of the Ministry of Finance (Tolosa, 
Kassahune, Martha, Birhanu, Markos and Motuma), Ministry of Health, Sep 13, 
2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
Focus group discussion concerning the activities of the Cheha district health offices,  
             Five Staffs members participated (Tamrate, Argaw, Selam, Kokebe and 
Misrake). Cheha district health Office, Sep 20, 2005, Emdibir. 
Focus group discussion concerning the activities of the Cheha district health office. Four 
         Staff members participated (Zeytuna, Fikre, Gebru and Teshome). Cheha district 
finance           office. Sep 24, 2005, Emdibir. 
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